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DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, AND INDIA
ARUNABHA BHOUMIK*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four planes, crashing one each
into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania.' Approximately three-thousand people from eighty-seven countries
were killed.2 That evening President Bush addressed the nation, stating that the
full resources of the intelligence and law enforcement communities would be
devoted to finding those responsible for the attacks.3 The President further stated
that, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts
and those who harbor them."4 On September 20, the President addressed a joint
session of Congress, declaring, "[o]n September the 1 th, enemies of freedom
committed an act of war against our country."' The war against terrorism was
6
soon in full swing.
Terrorism is of course not a new problem. Many have noted that history is
replete with instances of groups using violence to achieve political objectives.7
Modem terrorism, with its emphasis on "liberty and self-determination" can be
traced to the Britain's Glorious Revolution, and the use of violence for symbolic
purposes was later legitimated by the French Revolution.8 Others have noted that
terrorism was an effective tool of national liberation movements after the Second
' B.A., Binghamton Unversity, 2001; J.D. Harvard Law School, 2004. 1 am grateful to Amr Shalakany
for his guidance throughout the writing process, and to the staff of the Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy. I would also like to thank Lena Lee, Susannah Tobin, Josh Goodman, Anna
Lumelsky, Ben Schiffrin, Matt Van Itallie, and Beth Schonmuller for their valuable suggestions and
encouragement.
1. N. R. Kleinfield, U.S. Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon In Day
Of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, September 12, 2001, at Al.
2. Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328, 328
(2002).
3. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
2 0 0 10911-16.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
4. Id.
5. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American Public
(Sept. 20, 2001) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010
9 2 0-8 .html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2004).
6. Dana Milbank, Bush Disavows Hussein-Sept. 11 Link; Administration Has Been Vague on
Issue, but President Says No Evidence Found, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2003, at A18.
7. See, e.g., Ramsey Kleff, Terrorism: The Trinity Perspective, in TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
VIOLENCE: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL CONTROL 15 (Henry. H. Han ed., 1993) (noting
evidence of terrorism by the Israelites in the Old Testament).
8. Id. at 16.
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World War.9  During the 1970s and 1980s, the frequency of terrorist attacks
substantially increased. The U.S. Department of State, for example, recorded
13,572 incidents of international terrorism between 1968 and 1991.10 In 2002, the
State Department recorded 199 incidents of international terrorism." Furthermore,
there is good reason to believe that terrorist activity will persist in coming years.
Yonah Alexander, for example, notes that terrorism will increase because 1) it has
been successful in attracting publicity, 2) resources such as weapons, financing,
and communication are readily available, and 3) an international network of groups
and states supporting terrorism already exists.' 2 More importantly, many of the
underlying causes of terrorism, including the ideological roots of terrorist
movements, remain.'
3
Given these trends, it is clear that all governments need a comprehensive
strategy for effectively combating terrorism. This paper takes a comparative
approach to studying strategies implemented by various countries to combat
terrorism. I first examine what we mean by "terrorism." Next, I will examine
three models for dealing with terrorism: the "criminal justice" model, the
"intelligence" model, and the "war" model. Next, I will examine the
counterterrorism approaches employed by the United States, Israel, and India.
Using a functional approach, I will attempt to place each country's counterterrorist
policy within one of the three models discussed. Particular attention will be paid to
the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist policies in each country.
Specifically, I argue each country has adopted a war-model of counterterrorism,
and except in the case of India, has increased its application since the September
11 attacks. The "war on terror" terminology is more than just a rhetorical device.
Rather, it reflects a new model for both U.S. counterterrorism policies and those of
other countires-policies which have increasingly encroached on the civil liberties
and human rights, while at the same time ignoring the underlying causes of
terrorism and therefore exacerbating the terrorist threat.
9. See PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY: THE LIBERAL STATE RESPONSE 21
(2000).
10. A.J. Jongman, Trends in Terrorism, 1968-1988, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 34
(Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds. 1993).
11. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1. The State Department
notes that this is a 44% decline from the 355 attacks in 2001, and the number of deaths from attacks
decreased from 3,295 to 725. Id. However, the 2001 number includes the deaths resulting from the
September 11 attacks. The vast majority incidents of international terrorism in 2002 occurred in the
Middle East and Asia. No attacks were recorded in North America. Id. at xviii. Of course, the State
Department's report does not include the large numbers of acts of purely "domestic" terrorism. See
WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 45.
12. YONAH ALEXANDER, COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES 7 (2002).
13. Id.
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Defining the Problem
Terrorism is not simply the act of madmen. It is "a calculated move in a
political game.' 14 Actors engage in terrorism with objectives in mind. Moreover,
terrorism is an important means for non-state actors who lack resources to achieve
these objectives. 15 Violence is perceived to advance objectives, most typically by
inciting fear and bringing attention to the terrorist's cause, and by increasing the
bargaining power of groups engaged in terrorism.16 Terrorism, therefore, is not
merely an act of violence; it is "propaganda by deed."'
7
Beyond these observations, however, defining "terrorism" is problematic.
First, terrorism is not a monolithic concept.' 8 Wilkinson, for example, notes that a
typology of terrorism would include distinctions between "state" and "factional"
terrorism, international and domestic terrorism, and distinctions based on politics.' 9
Ideological underpinnings may include nationalism (as in the case of the Irish
Republican Army), ideological (Germany's Red Army Faction), religio-political
terrorists (Hamas in the Middle East), and single issue terrorists (such as anti-
abortion groups).2°
Second, the term terrorism has a significant negative connotation. One
condemns something by calling it terrorism. 2' As a result, many have noted that
the terms "terrorist" and "terrorism" have become so overused that they have lost
much of their significance.22 At the same time, this continuous expansion of the
definition of the word exaggerates the threat posed by terrorism and influences
public reaction, and therefore government policy.23 For example, some have noted
that compared to traffic accidents, drug crimes, or domestic violence, terrorism is a
minor problem.24 Yet large amounts of resources are devoted to the terrorist
threat.25 As a result, terrorists have disproportionate power over policy relative to
their threat.26  More importantly, the implicit condemnation of the word
14. PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY xi (1998).
15. RICHARD J. CHASDI, TAPESTRY OF TERROR: A PORTRAIT OF MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM,
1994-1999 3 (2002).
16. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 79 (2002).
17. L. Paul Bremer 1II, The West's Counter-Terrorist Strategy, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM, supra note 10, at 256.
18. Thomas H. Mitchell, Defining the Problem, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM 13 (David A. Charters ed., 1991).
19. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 19.
20. Id. at 19-20.
21. Mitchell, supra note 18, at 13.
22. See, e.g., Kleff, supra note 7, at 17.
23. Grant Wardlaw, The Democratic Framework, in THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM: ITS EFFECT
ON DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY IN SIX COUNTRIES 6 (David A. Charters ed., 1994).
24. Jongman, supra note 10, at 26.
25. See Jongman, supra note 10, at 26.
26. PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 4
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"terrorism" ignores the accurate if clich6 observation that, "one man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter., 27 The German occupying force during the Second
World War, for example, referred to the Dutch resistance as "terrorists. '28 In 1948,
several prominent American clergyman condemned Menachem Begin for leading
"a terroristic band."29 Begin, repeatedly asserted, however, that members of his
organization were "freedom fighters" rather than terrorists.3 °
Statutory definitions have tended to ignore this terrorist/freedom-fighter
ambiguity. The United States defines terrorism as "violent acts" or acts
"dangerous to human life" that appear to be intended to i) intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; (ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping.3' Similarly, the British Prevention of Terrorism Act
of 1974 defined terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends, and includes
any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the
public in fear. 3 2 Such definitions are unsatisfying because they are the creation of
policymakers, for whom acts that constitutes "terrorism" are often self-evident.
33
In addition, in marginal cases, the ability of executive officials to use discretion in
the enforcement of statutory provisions, allows legislators to be over-inclusive in
their definitions of terrorism. Statutory definitions are therefore not useful
frameworks for understanding terrorism, and may also be poor mechanisms for
understanding a country's counterterrorist policy.
In contrast, moral ambiguities considerably curtail the ability of academics to
settle on a single definition of terrorism. In 1988, Schmid and Jongman reported
109 different definitions currently in use among leading academics.34 Eventually,
and based on comments from the academic community, Schmid put forth his own
definition:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed
by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic,
criminal, or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct
targets of the violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims
of violence are generally chosen at randomly (targets of opportunity) or
selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and
serve as message generators. Threat - and violence-based communication
processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets
(2003).
27. Mitchell, supra note 18, at 9.
28. Alex P. Schmid, The Response Problem as a Definition Problem, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM, supra note 10, at 11.
29. ROBERT KUMAMOTO, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS,
1945-1976 12 (1999).
30. Id.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2000).
32. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 3.
33. See Mitchell, supra note 18, at 12.
34. Id. at 15.
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are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of
terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.
35
While Schmid's definition is comprehensive, the definition of terrorism I will
employ will differ in several ways. First, while States may engage in terrorism, I
will only be concerned with terrorism committed by sub-state actors. State
terrorism will typically involve conduct by a state against its own citizens, as was
the case in the Soviet Union under Stalin. 36  In such situations, a state's
"counterterrorist" policy is irrelevant. In situations where a state engages in direct
acts of violence against citizens of another State, such acts would constitute acts of
war. The models of counterterrorist policy that are the focus of this paper are
irrelevant in both situations. 37
Second, terrorism in this paper will only refer to activities which have the
purpose of effectuating political change. Idiosyncratic or purely "criminal"
terrorism, for example when organized crime actors use violence to prevent
prosecution, can most likely be dealt with through standard law enforcement
techniques because such terrorists will typically not have the resources of State
sponsorship or popular support that would require a state to choose between the
models discussed in this paper. In short, idiosyncratic, criminal, and state
terrorism, do not present the interesting dilemmas for democratic states that does
political sub-state terrorism.
Finally, Schmid's definition does not address the moral ambiguities of
terrorism. As mentioned earlier, policymakers perhaps do not need to concern
themselves if their definitions are over-inclusive because political forces will
dictate when they decide to employ their counterterrorist policies. However,
employing counterterrorist policy based on political preferences may lead to
accusations of hypocrisy. An over-inclusive definition may also allow a
government to use a terrorism statute to prosecute those whom legislators never
intended to come under the statute (for example, if the USA Patriot Act was used
to investigate animal rights groups). It may even be argued that such an approach
is antithetical to the rule of law.
The opposite approach is to simply condemn all terrorism. This approach is
advocated by Benjamin Netanyahu, who argues that "nothing justifies terrorism...
it is evil per se."'38 But such an approach is equally unsatisfactory because it does
not take into account the complexity of many of the world's conflicts. Where is
35. Schmid, supra note 28, at 8. However, Schmid acknowledges that his definition is too lengthy
for policymakers. Id. Eventually, Schmid asserts a legal definition of terrorism as the peace-time
equivalent of war-crimes (in other words, activities, which if committed during war time, would be
considered war-crimes).
36. See, e.g., Kleff, supra note 7, at 17-18.
37. State terrorism, here, is distinguished from state-sponsored terrorism. State-sponsored
terrorism refers to terrorism by sub-state groups which are supported by States. Unlike state terrorism,
state sponsored terrorism does raise interesting questions of which models of counterterrorist policy a
State should apply, and therefore is important to this analysis.
38. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 4.
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the line between terrorism and self-defense? Moreover, many of those who would
condemn all terrorism would agree that violence by States is often necessary.39 To
argue that members of groups may not resort to violence simply because they do
not have a State, smacks of circularity - often groups resort to terror because they
do not have their own State. A workable definition of terrorism therefore requires
sufficient flexibility to take into account the moral ambiguity of terrorism, while
not having so much flexibility so as to collapse into the quagmire of
deconstructionist nihilism.
Taking into account the idea that terrorism is the result of political
marginalization, I would therefore propose the following solution to the terrorist-
freedom-fighter dilemma: violence against a state constitutes "terrorism" when that
State is a well-working democracy. In a well-working democracy, groups would
have mechanisms to achieve political change without resorting to violence. Under
this definition, many groups which have been regarded as both "terrorists" and
"freedom-fighters," such as the African National Congress, would no longer be
considered terrorists because they were incapable of achieving their objectives
through political processes. In contrast, group which resorts to political violence
when, as an objective matter, alternatives are available, deserve the condemnation
of the term "terrorist.
''4°
Many ambiguities are avoided under this definition because the merits of
terrorists' claims are not at issue. Instead, moral ambiguities are collapsed into
questions of whether a set objectively verifiable procedural conditions generally
viewed as essential to democracy (e.g., free speech and press, secret ballots, multi-
party elections, rule of law, etc.) were met. Political responsiveness is also
something that is already measured by political scientists, albeit imperfectly. In
addition, while there is not complete agreement on what is a "democracy", there is
substantially more agreement on this than on what consititutes the differences
between terrorists and freedom-fighters.
The definition of terrorism for the purposes paper will therefore be: the use of
violence, or threat of violence, by sub-state actors, with or without the support of
some State actor, against a democratic State,4' which has the purpose of achieving
political change by instilling fear in the public or government of the target state.
B. Democracies and Terrorism
As a theoretical matter, stopping terrorism ought not be too difficult. Phillip
Heymann notes that to execute an act of terrorism, the terrorist needs a set of
42
definable things, such as access to the target, resources, and popular support.Prevention of terrorism merely requires denying the terrorist one of these
39. Id. at 70.
40. See also id. at 9 (noting that defining terrorism as "violent domestic politics" directed at
democratic regimes retains "moral clarity" for the definition).
41. I do not mean to imply that citizens of an autocratic state who are victims of political violence
do not fear or suffer. One suffers equally as the victim of violence regardless of whether that act was an
act of terrorism.
42. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 84.
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conditions. 43  Given that the problem and solution are definable, the problem
facing governments today is not preventing terrorism per se; it is preventing
terrorism within a democratic framework.44
There are several reasons why democracies will be particularly vulnerable to
terrorist attacks. First, democracies generally offer a wide degree of freedom of
movement, both within a country and across borders.4a This allows access to
targets,46 a means of escape, and the ability to seek shelter in foreign countries. 4 7
Second, free speech rights allow organizations to criticize leaders and institutions
to gain popular support,48 facilitating access to resources and recruits. This
problem is exacerbated by free association rights in democracies. 49 Third, the
constraints of democratic legal systems, with their emphasis on rights for the
accused, may make it difficult to investigate and prosecute terrorists.f ° Finally, in
addition to allowing the discussion of ideas, the free press which is necessary to
democracies allows for the uncontrolled dissemination of information about a
terrorist attack.51 A free media in a democracy therefore facilitates the very
attention that terrorist organizations seek.
Exacerbating this vulnerability is the fact that political pressures in
democracies can affect the way democracies respond to terrorist incidents.
Heymann, for example, suggests that responses to terrorism can be analyzed based
on three criteria: effectiveness, infringement of civil liberties, and political
expediency.5 2 A significant danger exists when policies infringe on civil liberties
and are also politically expedient (more so if the policy is also ineffective). The
biggest threat posed by terrorism may therefore be that the "interplay of terrorism,
public reaction, and governmental response... may severely undermine the nation's
democratic traditions.
5 3
Several authors have engaged in comparative studies of how different
countries have responded to terrorism. Christopher Hewitt (1984) approaches his
comparative analysis as an objective empiricist, with the purpose of determining
which policies have been most effective against urban terrorism.5 4 Five cases are
selected for his study: the IRA in Northern Ireland (1970-81), ETA in Spain (1975-
81), the Red Brigades/Frontline in Italy (1977-81), the Tupamaros in Uruguay
(1968-73) and EOKA in Cyprus (1955-58). 55 Using time-series analysis, Hewitt
examines the effectiveness of six counterterrorist policies: (1) ceasefires and
43. Id.; see also HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 40 (2003).
44. HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 159.
45. Schmid, supra note 28, at 18.
46. Id. at 19.
47. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 19.
48. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 23.
49. Schmid, supra note 28, at 18.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Id. at 22-23.
52. See HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 88.
53. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 2.
54. CHRISTOPHER HEWITT, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-TERRORIST POLICIES xi (1984).
55. Id. at 1-25.
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negotiations with terrorists, (2) improving economic conditions, (3) making
reforms, (4) collective punishments, (5) emergency powers and other anti-terrorist
legislation, and (6) the use of security forces.
5 6
In assessing ceasefires and negotiations, Hewitt concludes that ceasefires
result in a significant decline in violence. However, negotiations are unlikely to
result in conflict resolution because terrorist demands are often radical and
inflexible. As result, Hewitt concludes that negotiating truces with terrorist
organizations is a "short-sighted" policy that, if the truce is extended, will benefit
terrorists by giving them the opportunity to rebuild strength.57
In assessing the efficacy of improving economic conditions, Hewitt notes that
there is considerable evidence to suggest a connection between poverty and
violence.58 Economic conditions were a significant cause of violence in three of
five cases studied.59 Measuring the effect of specific government policies to
improve economic conditions is difficult because only in Northern Ireland was any
affirmative attempt to improve conditions made, and because it is always difficult
to tie specific governmental policies to economic effects. But Hewitt does
compare general economic conditions to violence rates. 60 Counter-intuitively, his
results show that there is no significant link between poor economic conditions and
terrorism, and terrorist activity may in fact be higher during good economic times.
Hewitt therefore concludes that general improvements in economic conditions
should not be expected to decrease rates of terrorism. 61 However, Hewitt does
argue that improving conditions before terrorist campaigns begin may prevent
violence before it starts, and that improving the condition of specific groups may
help reduce violence.62
In assessing the effect of reforms on terrorism, Hewitt notes that if terrorism
is the result of grievances, addressing those grievances should reduce violence.63
However, measuring the effect of reforms may be difficult because often reforms
occur in phases. Hewitt therefore breaks down "reforms" into two phases: (1)
ending the old regime, and (2) establishing new institutions. Based on this
analysis, Hewitt concludes that concessions made by governments "from a position
of weakness" will likely increase violence in the short term during the creation of
new institutions. It is only after several years that violence rates will begin to
decline. 64
56. Id. at 35.
57. Id. at 40-41.
58. Id. at 43.
59. Id. at 43-46. Northern Ireland, Italy, and Uruguay. Hewitt argues that economic conditions
were not depressed in either Cyprus or Spain, and notes that Basque (home to the ETA) was one of
richest regions of the latter.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id. at 47.
62. Id. at 43-47.
63. Id. at 47.
64. Id. at 54.
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Collective punishments were only undertaken in one of the cases in Hewitt's
study (Cyprus), and even there, they were used sparingly. The effect of collective
punishments is complicated because the level of generality upon which the
punishment is based may affect the deterrent effect of the punishment. Punishing a
large area assumes an equal distribution of terrorists within that area (which was
untrue in the case of Cyprus). Punishing a smaller area will reduce terrorism from
that area, but may simply shift it to other areas. Taking these considerations into
account, however, Hewitt concludes that collective punishments do result in a
generalized decline in terrorist activity.65  But this decline was a mere 1.7
percent.66 Collective punishments are a significant aspect of this study, and it is
important to note that even if this decline were applicable to other situations, the
small size of the decline calls into question the benefits of collective punishment as
compared to the human rights implications. In addition, the effect of collective
punishments declines with each successive punishment.67
Emergency or anti-terrorist legislation was undertaken in each case in
Hewitt's study. Hewitt examines six types of legislation in his study: (1) firearms
control; (2) requiring the population to carry identity cards; (3) increasing
investigatory powers of security forces (allowing searches of homes, arresting
people without charge); (4) the establishment of special courts and procedures; (5)
draconian penalties for terrorist offences; (6) the restriction of political rights such
as free speech or assembly. 68  Hewitt concludes that such legislation has no
discernable impact on violence.69 However, he does concede the impact may be
difficult to ascertain, most importantly because while legislation may grant certain
powers, the use of these powers by the executive will determine their effect.70
Finally, Hewitt studies two ways in which the use of security forces may
decrease terrorism. First, military forces may engage in patrols, mass searches,
and counterinsurgency tactics.7' These tactics lead to no decline in violence rates.
They are in fact highly correlated with increases in violence, though Hewitt argues
that this may be because an increase in violence causes increased patrols, rather
than the reverse.72 The second tactic that security forces may take is to arrest terror
suspects. Hewitt finds a significant relationship between arrests and decreases in
violence.73
Like Hewitt, Crelinsten and Schmid engage in cross-national study of
counterterrorist policies. Their study compares counterterrorist policies in eight
European countries: the Netherlands, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Austria. Crelinsten and Schmid's study differs from
65. Id. at 55-60.
66. Id. at 59.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 35.
69. Id. at 66-67.
70. Id. at 67.
71. Id. at 82-84.
72. Id. at 86.
73. Id.
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Hewitt's in two ways. First, Crelinsten and Schmid do not attempt empirical
assessment of each country's approach, instead relying on descriptions and
qualitative assessments of experts from each country.74 In addition, Crelinsten and
Schmid are concerned with analyzing counterterrorist policies through the lens of
both effectiveness and democratic acceptability.75
Crelinsten and Schmid ultimately do not create a set of "best practices," but
rather discern a set of trends for counterterrorist policies. They first place
counterterrorist policies into two categories: conciliatory, meaning either
negotiation, or reform; and repressive (criminal justice and military).76 Other axes
of classification discussed by Crelinsten and Schmid are short-term versus long
term responses, the proactiveness of responses, and whether the action deals with
the coercive (i.e. violent) capabilities or political capabilities (i.e., ability to gain
attention and support) of terrorists.77 Finally, Crelinsten and Schmid differentiate
between "domestic" and "international" responses to terrorism.
78
By comparing counterterrorist policies of different countries, Crelinsten and
Schmid discern several trends. First, the authors observe that while
counterterrorist policies in the 1970s emphasized the use of criminal justice
("legal-repressive") mechanisms and international legal instruments, there has
been a modem trend towards the use of the military because of weaknesses in the
criminal justice model.79 This trend is demonstrated by the Reagan administration
during the 1980s, which culminated in the bombing of Tripoli in April 1986.80
Second, in comparing the criminal justice and war models through the lens of
democratic acceptability, Crelinsten and Schmid note that, counterintuitively, it is
through the criminal justice model that Western countries have shifted away from
democratic acceptability. 81  This is due to common measures adopted in the
criminal justice model, including special legislation, the creation of special courts,
rules of evidence or procedure, and increased police powers. One particularly
common power is a prolonged ability to detain suspects without charge and
without access to counsel. In addition, it is in the domestic response to terrorism
that the movement away from democratic principles has been most evident.
82
Finally, Crelinsten and Schmid suggest two changes to counterterrorist policy.
First, they suggest the adoption of a definition of terrorism as the "peacetime
74. Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten, Editor's Introduction: Western Responses to
Terrorism, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, supra note 10, at 4-5 [hereinafter Editor's Intro].
75. Id. at 5.
76. Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five
Year Balance Sheet, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, supra note 10, at 309 [hereinafter
Twenty-Five Year Balance].
77. Id. at 310.
78. Id. at 312.
79. Id. at 332-35.
80. Id. at 315-16.
81. Id. at 334.
82. Id. at 335.
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equivalent of war crimes." 83 Schmid argues that while such a definition would be
under-inclusive, it is more likely to achieve consensus because there is a consensus
on the definition of war crimes.84 Moreover, such a definition would reflect the
criminality of terrorism while acknowledging its political dimension." Second,
Crelinsten and Schmid suggest increased emphasis on addressing the political
capabilities of terrorist groups rather then simply their violent activities.8 6 In
practical terms, this means more emphasis on delegitimation of terrorists as
opposed to a singular focus on preventing terrorist acts. Crelinsten and Schmid
argue that such methods may enable governments to find new ways of addressing
terrorism which are more compatible with a democratic framework.
87
Charters (1994) examines counterterrorist policies in six countries: the United
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Israel, and the United States.88 Like Crelinsten
and Schmid, Charters engages in a comparative study of counterterrorist policies
using assessments from authors from each country examined.8 9 However, rather
than discerning trends in policies like Crelinsten and Schmid, Charters' tends to
focus predominantly on the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist
policies. 90
Charters first observes that while terrorism is not by itself a threat to
democracy, it does pose several threats to the democratic systems.91  Most
importantly, Charters notes that in most countries, terrorist activity was met with
public desire and government acquiescence in harsher counterterrorist policies that
undermine democratic values.92  The threat of domestic terrorism was a
particularly strong inducement to such policies. Only in the United States, for
example, were severe measures favored for use outside the country, presumably
because the threat to the United States remained overseas for the most part.
93
Next, Charters measures the effectiveness of several counterterrorist tactics
relevant to his study. First, he notes that negotiation was generally an ineffective
strategy because terrorists generally regarded deals as temporary ploys, not
permanent prohibitions on the use of force.94 Second, Charters notes that every
country introduced some form of target hardening (decreasing access to targets) as
counterterrorist tactic, but it was generally introduced as a reaction to attack rather
83. Id. at 336.
84. Schmid, supra note 28, at 11-12.
85. Editor's Intro, supra note 74, at 336.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 337.
88. David A. Charters, THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM: ITS EFFECT ON DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTY IN SIX COUNTRIES, supra note 23, at I.
89. Id. at 1-2.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 212.
92. Id. at 212-13.
93. See id. at 13. Most laws passed by Congress, for example, dealt with federal authority
overseas.
94. Id. at 215.
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than as a proactive measure. 95 Charters argues that target-hardening may have
some deterrent effect, but its real value may lie on its psychological benefits.
96
Most importantly, however, target hardening demonstrates an important point:
democratic societies cannot both provide total security and maintain the openness
requisite to democracy.97 Third, Charters argues that although military reprisals
lead to some attrition in terrorist ranks, it was generally an ineffective deterrent to
terrorist activity, often leading to increased hostility.98 As a result, Charters argues
that the role of the military should be limited to hostage rescue operations which
are morally defensible, defined, and can be conducted within a constitutional
framework. 99
As for the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist policies, Charters
argues that there was no "wholesale rush to restrict freedoms" despite rhetoric
about the need to "stamp out terrorism."' 100  Charters does note several
infringements common to counterterrorist measures, including: expanded search
and arrest powers, increased periods of detention, proscription of terrorist
organizations, and expanded deportation of powers.'0  However, given the
apparent resilience of democracies in the face of terrorism, and the success in
countering terrorist attacks, Charters argues that effectiveness and liberty are
compatible (though, as noted earlier, total eradication is impossible while
maintaining democratic openness). 0 2 Charters, like Heymann, concludes that the
greatest threat comes from public reaction to the threat, not the threat itself.' 3
Fear reduction measures (such as crisis management) may therefore be some of the
most important counterterrorist measures a government should take.' 4
Finally Yonah Alexander (2002) compares counterterrorist policy in ten
countries: the United States, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Spain, the U.K., Israel,
Turkey, India, and Japan. 105 Like prior studies, Alexander relies on assessments of
policymakers in each country, with the specific intention of offering a
"comprehensive 'best practices' strategy."' 1 6  However, Alexander's study is
unique in that the individual assessments and his findings are informed by the
September 11 attacks.
Alexander divides his conclusions into two areas. First, Alexander argues
that the political and legal dynamic, reflecting the government policies vis-a-vis
95. Id. at218.
96. Id. at 219.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 219-20.
99. Id. at 220.
100. Id. at 221.
101. See id. at 222.
102. See id. at 223.
103. Id. at 224.
104. Id. at 224.
105. Yonah Alexander, Introduction to COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES,
supra note 12, at 2 [hereinafter Introduction].
106. Id..
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terrorism is crucial to explaining the success or failure of policies.10 7 He argues
that positive political environment is critical to a successful counterterrorist
policy. 08 For example, Peru was successful in its counterterrorist campaign
because the military did not substantially "interfere with the lives of the people,"
and in fact, with them, forged constructive ties. 1' 9 Alexander also argues that
Turkey's changing of its criminal procedure laws to comport with international
human rights norms aided its counterterrorist policy. 10
Second, Alexander notes several "best practices" which aid counterterrorist
policy. Alexander first notes the importance of intelligence to operational success
in counterterrorism."' Next, Alexander argues for a limited military role in
counterterrorist policy, and like Charters, cites hostage rescue as the archetypal
military role in counterterrorism." 2 Finally, citing success in Northern Ireland, but
failure in the Spanish and Israeli cases, Alexander cites "mixed results" for
negotiation with terrorist groups."
3
C. Models of Counterterrorist Policy
As noted earlier, Crelinsten and Schmid, in describing "repressive" models of
counterterrorist policy, distinguish between the "criminal justice" and "war"
models." 4 Repressive models stand in contrast to "conciliatory" models, which
seek to prevent terrorism either through negotiation or reform. Conciliatory
models change the rational calculation of terrorism by addressing grievances.
They prevent violence by reducing the benefits, thereby altering the calculus of the
terrorists' cost-benefit analysis. In contrast, repressive models seek to prevent
violence by either punishing terrorists for their acts, or physically preventing them
acting in the first place (for example by destroying a terrorist base), thereby
increasing the cost of terrorist acts.
The purpose of this section is to compare three models of a repressive
counterterrorist policy: the criminal justice model, the intelligence model, and the
war model. I will first discuss the key characteristics, foreign and domestic, of
each model. Next, I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each model.
Third, I will compare each model based on three variables: accountability,
collectivity, and timing. Accountability (open or secret) refers to the extent to
which state's preventative activities are open to public scrutiny. Collectivity
(individual or group) refers to the specificity of a state's counterterrorist policy,
i.e., the extent to which a state's counterterrorist policy is directed at large groups,
as opposed to being directed at individuals (or organizations) who are suspected of
being terrorists. By timing, I mean whether a policy is exclusively reactive, or
107. Yonah Alexander, Conclusion to COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES,
supra note 12, at 390 [hereinafter Conclusion].
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 391.
111. Id. at 391.
112. See id. .
113. Id. at 391-92.
114. See Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 309.
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whether proactive measures are utilized by the government.
Three caveats should be mentioned at this point. First, the three models are
not mutually exclusive. There is, for example, a widespread consensus on the
importance of intelligence, regardless of the approach of a government S, and it
seems that every government will have to use force to some extent. These models
are therefore not meant to be exhaustive set of options available to states
employing them, but rather are merely analytical tools for understanding the
implications of policies and legislation adopted. Second, there are options
available to governments (for example, training hostage rescue specialists) that this
analysis is not concerned with because they have no civil liberties implications, nor
do they reflect choices being made among the models discussed. Finally, the
descriptions of the models below (and later the classification of the different
countries counterterrorist policies) will be functional in nature. For example, the
use of special operations personnel or undercover law enforcement agents may
come under the intelligence model, even though they technically may be military
or police units, if their use is more akin to the intelligence model when analyzed
based on the axes discussed above. The functions and implications of the activity
or policy are more important than its official classification.
Criminal Justice
The criminal justice model refers to a model in which terrorism is primarily
treated as a crime, and "the onus of response is placed upon criminal prosecution
and punishment within the rule of law."'" 6 The criminal justice model therefore
prevents terrorism in the same manner as any other crime-by deterring would be
terrorists through the threat of punishment, by communicating society's
condemnation of the act, and detaining terrorists, thereby preventing them from
committing further acts of terrorism. The paradigmatic use of the criminal justice
model will involve the capture and prosecution of a suspect after a terrorist act.
With regard to collectivity, therefore, the criminal justice model focuses on
individuals rather than groups. In addition, the rule of law in liberal democracies
depends on the public trials, which makes the criminal justice model open on the
accountability axis. Finally, since criminal statutes generally have an act
requirement, the criminal justice model will depend on the prosecution after the
fact, making it reactive as opposed to proactive.
17
Since almost all terrorist acts would be criminal regardless of motivation,"
I8
the domestic security features of the criminal justice model resemble standard
security in a liberal democratic state. Such features include clearly defined
115. David A. Charters, Counterterrorism Intelligence: Sources, Methods, Process, and Problems,
in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 18, at 227.
116. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333.
117. See A. Stuart Farson, Criminal Intelligence vs. Security Intelligence: A Reevaluation of the
Police Role in the Response to Terrorism, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,
supra note 18, at 193 (noting that law enforcement is generally reactive in nature because an
investigation only begins after there is cause to believe a crime has been committed).
118. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 69-70.
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criminal statutes, a police force which investigates breaches of the law, and
punishment after individualized determination of guilt in a public trial. Beyond
these default features, a state applying a criminal justice model may supplement its
legal system with mechanisms designed specifically for the terrorist threat. For
example, a state may enhance penalties if a crime is deemed to be a terrorist act." 9
A state may also change rules of evidence and procedure in terrorist trials, or
create special courts for dealing with terrorism.120  Finally, a state may create
"advocacy crimes" which criminalize advocacy of violence, 12 1 or criminalize
membership in certain organizations. 1
22
The international aspects of the criminal justice model are limited. First, a
state employing a criminal justice model may increase cooperation with foreign
law enforcement agencies to aid in the capture and extradition of terrorist
suspects123 Second, the criminal justice model will involve cooperation among
countries to disrupt terrorists' access to finances by criminalizing the financial
support of terrorist groups (this of course can also occur at the domestic level).
Finally, the criminal justice model may involve the use of sanctions against states
which do not cooperate in counterterrorist efforts. While this last example does
not intuitively seem like "criminal justice" (and is also collective in nature), this
strategy is commonly discussed in conjunction with the criminalization of
terrorism. 24 In addition, the use of sanctions is more compatible with the rule of
law than the use of force inherent to the intelligence and war models.
The criminal justice model has several advantages. First, the criminalization
of terrorism communicates moral condemnation. Though this effect may be
negligible in many instances, in marginal cases such moral condemnation ought to
deter some terrorism. This effect can be amplified by the legitimacy of the
government criminalizing the act. Second, the prosecution of terrorists pursuant to
criminal statutes is less subject to political preferences, and is therefore more
consistent with the rule of law that is essential to democracy. 25 For example, the
prosecution of a terrorist pursuant to a pre-existing criminal statute, as opposed to
assassination based on determinations made by executive officials, is less
vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. In addition, the criminalization of terrorism is
an implicitly less violent solution, and is therefore more consistent with democratic
values. Both of these in turn increase legitimacy of the state, and consequently the
moral condemnation of criminalization. Third, the openness of the criminal justice
system increases the legitimacy of the criminal justice model, and makes it less
prone to abuses of human rights. 126 Finally, Hewitt notes that the prosecution of
119. See HEwlrT, supra note 54, at 63.
120. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 334; see also, HEYMANN supra note 14, at 122.
121. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 111; HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 106.
122. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 99; HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 108-09.
123. See WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 113.
124. See, e.g., STANSFIELD TURNER, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY 234 (1991); Philip C. Wilcox,
Jr., United States, in COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 46.
125. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 115.
126. But see Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333-34. Crelinsten & Schmid argue that
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terrorists has had a significant impact on the reduction of violence. 27 However, it
is unclear whether this is merely the result of the incapacitation of the individual
terrorist, in which case incapacitation outside the criminal justice framework ought
to have the same effect.
The criminal justice model has several drawbacks. First, terrorism as defined
here is different from ordinary crime. 128 Terrorism is more organized than most
criminal activities, making punishment more difficult. This leads to a decreased
deterrent effect for the punishment relative to other crimes. In addition, since
terrorists are politically motivated, people are more likely to be sympathetic to
their cause than in the case of profit-motivated organized crime. This may
translate to greater resources, access to recruits, and increased difficulty in
detaining suspects because they can seek shelter among sympathetic groups.
Terrorism also arouses greater public fear than other organized crime, and the
stakes may be significantly higher.
129
Second, the use of criminal punishment to deter terrorism is hindered in
several ways. The deterrent effect of any criminal statute is of course hard to
measure. In addition, as I just mentioned, greater organization in the case of
terrorism leads to greater difficulty in capture, and can therefore lead to an under-
enforcement problem. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, in the case of suicide
terrorist attacks, it is impossible to increase penalties to increase deterrence.
30
Moreover, to the extent the squalid economic conditions are one of the causes of
terrorism, it is arguably impossible to increase deterrence in the case of non-
suicide terrorism as well.
Third, in the case of terrorism, it may be difficult to achieve the moral
condemnation which is essential to criminal enforcement because of popular
support that the terrorist's cause enjoys.1 31 The fourth problem with the criminal
justice model is almost the opposite: to the extent that moral condemnation is
achieved, the criminal justice model precludes later reconciliation with terrorists.
3 2
Finally, and perhaps the most significant, the criminal justice model tends to
be reactive in nature. Given the scale that modem terrorism might take, this may
make the criminal justice model simply irrelevant in combating the terrorist
threat. 1 33 Reactive forms of enforcement make sense in cases where the risk of
it is primarily via the criminal justice model that Western responses to terrorism have moved away from
democratic acceptability. However, under my model, a move away from democratic acceptability (for
example by reducing due process rights, would move a states response away from the criminal justice
model (because it is less accountable for example) and into one of the other models.
127. See HEWITT, supra note 54, at 86.
128. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 7.
129. Id. at 113.
130. Id. atxi.
131. Id. at 47.
132. See Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 36; but see WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 101 (arguing that
reconciliation and criminalization are not incompatible in that criminalization can be limited to those in
the terrorist groups who are unwilling to work toward peace).
133. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 154 (noting that the threat of terrorism using weapons of
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harm for each individual incident is small, and is repeated, because penalties and
enforcement techniques can be adjusted overtime to the optimal level. In contrast,
reactive enforcement is obsolete in large scale terrorist attacks, where the penalty
cannot be increased beyond punishment for a small attack. More importantly,
punishment may be irrelevant because, frankly, the damage is done.
In conclusion, the criminal justice model has the primary advantage of being
consistent with democratic values of openness and rule of law. It does, however,
have significant drawbacks, the most significant of which are the difficulty of
increasing deterrence and its predominantly reactive nature. It may therefore be an
effective tool to combat low yield terrorism where the actors are repeat players, but
it will be obsolete in efforts to combat high yield attacks.
Intelligence
The intelligence model involves the use of the intelligence apparatus of a state
as the primary mechanism of counterterrorist policy. Under this model, terrorism
is not viewed primarily as a criminal activity, but rather as a threat to the security
of the state. 34 Terrorists act in small organizations, and once this security issue is
recognized, policymakers need to know the capabilities, plans, and objectives of
these groups.13 5  The goal of intelligence investigations is therefore not
condemnation and punishment (and thus general deterrence) as in the case of the
law enforcement model, but rather to "acquire information which will allow those
with coercive capacity to prevent an undesirable outcome from taking place."'
' 36
The paradigmatic application of the intelligence model, therefore, is the use of
intelligence officers or informants to infiltrate an organization to gain information
about a group, and to then use that information to thwart an attack. 137 Like the law
enforcement model, therefore, the intelligence model focuses on individuals and
organizations rather than on collective populations. However, unlike the criminal
justice model the intelligence model tends to be preventive rather than reactive. 138
In addition to this paradigm several common counterterrorist policies can be
classified as part of an intelligence model. First, a state may expand the
investigatory powers of law enforcement beyond the investigation of criminal
activity. Typically, this will involve lower (or no) warrant requirements. 139 While
these searches may be conducted by law enforcement, I have classified them under
an intelligence model because they do not require a suspicion of a crime, but rather
a threat to security. 140  Closely connected to lower warrant requirements is the
mass destruction is qualitatively different than other forms of terrorism).
134. See FARSON, supra note 117, at 193.
135. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 105-06.
136. FARSON, supra note 117, at 222.
137. See HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 101.
138. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 129; FARSON, supra note 117, at 193.
139. See, e.g., HEWITT, supra note 54, at 62; HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 125-26 (noting
expansive search authority in Northern Ireland under amendments to the Emergency Provisions Act,
and in the United States under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)).
140. In the case of FISA, a threat to security is in the form of foreign intelligence agents or
terrorists. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2004).
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availability of involuntary confessions,"'4 the use of which would also tend to push
a state away from the criminal justice model towards an intelligence model. Lower
search requirements and the use of involuntary confessions reflect a key feature of
the intelligence model: the need to prevent violence, rather than merely punish it,
leads to more lenient rules than in the case of criminal investigation. 142 Both of
these features may be folded into a third intelligence model feature: the use of
domestic intelligence agencies rather than law enforcement for internal security.
143
Such agencies manifest the same notions as the lower warrant and confession
requirements: treating security and criminality as distinct problems with different
solutions. A fourth feature of the intelligence model is the use of deadly force
against specific targets.'44 Such force would of course occur outside the protection
of traditional notions of due process, and is therefore antithetical to the criminal
justice model.' 45 Finally, an intelligence model may involve the use of secret
tribunals to try terrorist suspects. Such tribunals may come under the auspices of
the military, but I have classified them under the intelligence model because of
their secretive nature and the specificity of their targets.
46
The primary advantage of the intelligence model is that it compensates for a
key weakness in the criminal justice model: that terrorism is a more difficult
problem than ordinary crime and therefore procedural rules should not constrain
counterterrorist policy. 47 At the same time, the intelligence model recognizes that
sub-state terrorism is also not best handled by conventional military forces. 148 In
addition, the proactive nature of the intelligence model makes it better suited than
the criminal justice model for dealing with rare and high yield terrorism. Finally,
proponents of targeted assassination under the intelligence model argue that it is
easier, less costly, and more certain than law enforcement.
149
There are several disadvantages to the intelligence model. The activities of
intelligence agencies are often secret. Not only are intelligence agencies given
expansive powers of search, and for taking confessions, they are also not limited in
what they can investigate (law enforcement are limited by the definitions of
crimes), and have no burden of proof for their findings. 50 In addition, the use of
targeted assassinations, while efficient, effectively allows for the punishment of
141. See HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 109.
142. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 129.
143. See HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 134-35.
144. See Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 38; HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 115.
145. The use of deadly force in self-defense by law enforcement is qualitatively different than
targeted assassinations being discussed here.
146. When special courts are not secret and afford substantial procedural rights to defendants, they
may come under the criminal justice, rather than intelligence model. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note
14, at 122 (discussing procedures for the British "Diplock" courts which tried suspected terrorists in
Northern Ireland).
147. See Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333.
148. William V. Cowan, Intelligence, Rescue, Retaliation and Decision Making, in TERRORISM
AND POLITICS 5 (Barry Rubin ed., 1991).
149. Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 38.
150. HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 138.
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individuals through executive, rather than judicial findings. Assassinations are
"lawless."'' Furthermore, even where the judiciary plays a role in the intelligence
model, it is in the form of secret courts which have the same accountability
problems. Such secrecy, while useful in counterterrorism policy, is antithetical to
democratic values. In short, because of a lack of openness and the potential for
arbitrary enforcement, the intelligence model undermines the rule of law.
15 2
War
The final model is the war model, under which counterterrorist policy relies
on the use of the military and retaliatory strikes rather than law enforcement or
intelligence operations. 153 Use of the war model increased during the 1980s
because of policymakers' increased attention to the problem of state-sponsored
terrorism. 15 4  The use of military force was therefore justified under the
international laws of self-defense. 155 The paradigmatic example of this model is
the use of the military against the government and population of another state in
response to a state's sponsorship or inaction vis-A-vis a terrorist organization. Like
the intelligence model, the war model views terrorism as a security problem rather
than a criminal one. But the distinguishing feature of the war model in comparison
to the criminal justice and the intelligence model is that it relieson the use of force
against large groups in order to achieve counterterrorist objectives. With regard to
accountability, the war model is mixed. While less accountable than the criminal
justice model (for which ultimate decision making occurs in the full light of public
accountability), the war model is inherently less secretive than the intelligence
model because the scope of the government's action (e.g., attacking a foreign
country) cannot occur without some public knowledge and therefore political
accountability. With regard to timing, the military model is also mixed. Military
retaliation is reactive, but recent U.S. policy in the area of pre-emptive strikes
indicates a move toward a proactive war model. In addition, since many of the
domestic measures I will discuss in the war model are preventative, I will classify
the war model as a proactive rather than reactive model.
Intuitively, in the international arena, the war model generally employs large
scale attacks against foreign states 156 in order to effectuate counterterrorist policy.
By definition these attacks lack precision and may involve significant collateral
151. DERSHOWrTZ, supra note 16, at 120.
152. See Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 38.
153. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333. Crelinsten & Schmid argue that the use of
special forces also comes under the war model, but, as mentioned earlier, I treat such forces as part of
the intelligence model because their use indicates specific rather than collective targets.
154. Id. at 314.
155. See generally Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force By a State Against Terrorists in
Another Country, in TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL
CONTROL 243-66 (Henry H. Han ed. 1993) (discussing the international legal framework for the use of
force by states in response to terrorist attacks).
156. "Foreign state" is used loosely here to include areas under the control of organizations legally
distinct from the State employing the war model, such as the Occupied Territories in the Middle East, or
Jammu and Kashmir in South Asia.
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damage.157  Such attacks can serve several purposes. First, they can be used
preventatively to destabilize foreign governments that are considered terrorist
threats. Because we are only concerned with sub-state groups, the threat can come
from, and the response is directed against, states which sponsor terrorism, or
against states who may sell arms to terrorists (both of which were part of the
justification for the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003).58 Second,
military action can be used against a foreign state as retaliation for a terrorist attack
(as was the case in the U.S. led war against Afghanistan in the fall of 2001).159
In the domestic arena, the war model is less clear because war is generally
seen as an act taken by a state against another state. Based on the framework
developed earlier, several collective-preventative measures taken by states (in what
is sometimes called a "security model"' 60) can be considered part of the war
model. These measures include so called "target hardening" measures which seek
to prevent access to potential targets.16 ' A variation of this target hardening
measure is to generally restrict the freedom of movement, for example across sub-
national boundaries, or by requiring identification cards. 162 In addition, a state may
place severe restrictions on immigration in order to prevent terrorist infiltration.'
63
Finally, a state may engage in profiling, based on some "cheaply identifiable"
characteristics (such as ethnicity or country of origin) in order to facilitate the
prevention of attacks.164 These measures while on their face have little to do with
war, are similar to other aspects of the war model in that they apply tactics against
a set of persons which is larger than set of actual targets, because it is more
efficient to go after the larger set, and it is assumed that the larger set will include
the actual target. In other words, like collateral damage in war, these measures
force innocents to bear the costs of a policy because it is more efficient than being
precise. In addition, these measures resemble actual measures taken against
groups in times of war, such as the internment of Japanese-Americans in the
United States during World War II. As such, the inclusion of these domestic
measures in a "war" model is entirely appropriate.
There are several advantages to the war model. Like the intelligence model,
the availability of proactive measures affords the war model a significant
advantage over the criminal justice model. In addition, the (reactive) use of
157. Maurice Tugwell, Military and Paramilitary Measures, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES To
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 18, at 340.
158. Barton Gellman & Daffia Linzer, Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide, WASH. POST, Oct. 22,
2004, at Al.
159. William T. Baker & Mark L. Evans, The Year in Review 2001, U.S. NAVY'S NAVAL
AVIATION NEWS, July-Aug., 2002, at 1.
160. See Ronald D. Crelinsten & Iffet Ozut, Counterterrorism Policy in Fortress Europe:
Implications for Human Rights, in EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES AGAINST TERRORISM: GOVERNMENTAL
POLICIES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 258 (Fernando Reinares ed. 2000).
161. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 92.
162. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 114-15.
163. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 92.
164. Symposium, Unobjectionable but Insufficient-Federal Initiatives in Response to the
September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1145 (2002).
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military strength in retaliation for a terrorist attack is entirely consistent with both
moral "just war" requirements and international law. In this way, military
retaliation accomplishes the same general and specific deterrence, and
incapacitation, that the criminal justice model accomplishes.' 65  Furthermore, as
mentioned earlier, terrorism draws tremendous public attention relative to its actual
dangers. A terrorist act will be followed by tremendous public pressure on
governments to "react., 16 6 The use of military strength in response to a terrorist
attack satisfies this need, and therefore has a tremendous political advantage.
Arguably, such reaction may prevent retaliation by the public against minority
groups within the state by satiating the public's need for revenge. Finally, the war
model addresses a significant weakness in both the criminal justice and
intelligence models in that the deterrent effect is limited. Under both the criminal
justice and intelligence models, coercive action is limited to terrorists themselves.
The deterrent effect of retaliation is capped at the lives of the terrorists, and is
therefore limited since the punishment for killing one person is the same as for
killing one-hundred. In the case of suicide terrorists, the deterrent is non-existent.
The collectivity of the military models allows States to increase the penalty for a
terrorist act to include retaliation against states and civilians.
1 67
The war model has several disadvantages. First, like the intelligence model,
the main disadvantage of the war model is its effect on civil liberties. War creates
a sense of urgency and priority which belittles democracy.' 68 Moreover, domestic
aspects of the war model, such as profiling, are archetypal civil rights violations.
Many have also argued that policies such as profiling are not only unjust, they are
ineffective because of the risk of false positives, wasting resources, and because
profiling may cause security officials to ignore threats that don't fit their profile.' 69
Second, repressive policies such as profiling may anger minority groups,
leading to mistrust of government officials, decreasing the likelihood of
collaboration with minority groups in order to prevent attacks.' 70 This is part of a
broader theme of the war model: both on the domestic level, and the international
level, the war model angers target populations, and may lead to increased
terrorism171 Many have argued that often the purpose of terrorist attacks is to
provoke just such a response.'
72
165. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 68-69.
166. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 314.
167. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at xi.
168. HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 114.
169. Chistopher Edley, Jr., The New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/11, in THE WAR
ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 177-78 (Richard C. Leone & Greg
Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003); HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 99.
170. See, e.g., As'AD ABuKHALIL, BIN LADEN, ISLAM, AND AMERICA'S "WAR ON TERRORISM"
25-26 (2002).
171. Id. at 93; Heymann, supra note 14, at 100; Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 45; HEWITT, supra
note 54, at 86.
172. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 317; D.P. SHARMA, COUNTERING TERRORISM 68
(1992).
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Third, the deterrent effect of the war model is also questionable. Heymann
notes that military strikes against foreign states may fail because the target state of
the retaliation may not have the capability to stop the terrorist, the strikes may
create united opposition against the retaliating state, and the state may continue to
support the group in secret. 73 Heymann therefore argues that a State is likely to
exaggerate the deterrent effect of its military strikes. 174  The same is true of
collective actions against populations rather than states. Some, such as Alan
Dershowitz, have argued in favor of collective punishments (such as the
destruction of Palestinian villages in response to terrorist attacks). 175 Such policies
are folly. As in the case of actions against states, collective action against groups
assumes that the groups can stop terrorists' acts (or that the terrorist cares about the
rest of the population). Moreover, the deterrent effect of destroying a village is
unclear. Assume that terrorists are rationale, and a government makes terrorists
aware of its collective punishment policy. Terrorists would take this danger into
account before deciding to attack. They would further not bank on their group not
being identified since terrorists often claim responsibility for their attacks. Assume
now that the terrorists do engage in an attack. Clearly, since they were aware of
the policy, and they did not assume they would not be caught, the destruction of a
village was not enough to deter the attack. 176  Now further assume that the
terrorists are contemplating a second attack, after a village has been destroyed.
What, now, is the deterrent effect of the collective punishment policy? The
terrorists now merely have less to fear because they have one less village to fear
destruction. In other words, after each successive attack, the terrorists' incentives
are the same, but their costs are decreasing. A state may of course increase the
collective penalty after each attack, but there is still a finite amount of punishment
a state can dole out. The deterrent effect of collective punishments such as these
would therefore decrease consistently after the first instance of punishment-a
point which is empirically verified by Hewitt, though it is unclear whether this is
the underlying reason.'
77
Finally, the war model makes international cooperation more difficult. War is
a political choice, and the war model implies terrorism is a political rather than
criminal act. 178  As such, international cooperation would require political
agreement, as opposed to the criminal act of terrorism for which international
cooperation would be easier.' 79 Second, war breeds mistrust in the international
173. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 73.
174. Id.
175. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 176-77.
176. Of course, to counter this point by arguing that the terrorists may not be rational would
undermine the very notion of a deterrence theory to begin with, and would make collective punishments
an act of revenge.
177. See HEWITr, supra note 54, at 59.ee also Bryan Brophy-Baermann & John A.C. Conybeare,
Retaliating Against Terrorism: Rationale Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion,
38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 196 (1994) (noting that rational expectations of retaliation to terrorist attacks will
undercut the deterrent effect of retaliation).
178. See Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333.
179. Malcolm Anderson, Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation, in
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community, regardless of circumstance. Many in Europe, for example, fear that
after September 11, the United States is using the war against terrorism as an
excuse to pursue other foreign policy goals.1
8 0
To summarize, the war model, while possibly useful with regard to state
sponsored terrorism, and politically expedient, has significant drawbacks. Most
importantly, the war model has significant consequences for human rights,
domestically and internationally. These infringements breed support for terrorist
causes. Moreover, the deterrent effect of the war model is questionable. Finally,
the war model strains the possibility of international cooperation in counter
terrorist efforts.
D. Conclusion
There is always a tension between liberty and security. Current trends
indicate that terrorism is not a temporary phenomenon, but one that will continue
and perhaps increase in the future. As a result, the effect of counterterrorism
policies on civil liberties will be a substantial concern in coming years.
An understanding of the effect of counterterrorist policies on civil liberties
must begin with understanding what we mean by terrorism. A comprehensive
definition of terrorism, however, is difficult to derive. A definition which is under-
inclusive is vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy, as is an over-inclusive definition
which is enforced selectively. Moreover, standard definitions of terrorism may not
take into account the moral ambiguities involved when individuals choose to
engage in violence to achieve their goals. To argue that terrorism is wrong per se
is overly simplistic, and assumes a definition with which to begin. Perhaps
terrorism is always wrong, but if this is the case, a definition must include all
condemnable acts, and exclude acts which are not necessarily condemnable. To
this end, I have argued terrorism should be defined as political violence against a
democracy. Political violence against a democracy is unnecessary (and therefore
immoral given the costs) because of the ability to achieve political ends through
non-violent means. Moreover, there is less ambiguity in this definition because
defining a "democracy" is more objective than defining what political causes are
"worth" violent means and which are not.
In an effort to balance security and liberty, democracies have employed
various models of counterterrorist policy: the criminal justice model, the
intelligence model, and the war model. Each model treats terrorism as a different
type of problem, and the resulting policies can be analyzed based on three
variables: collectivity (how large to target group of the policy is relative to the
class of terrorists), accountability (how open the policies are to public scrutiny),
and timing (whether the model is predominantly reactive or proactive). These
variables reflect the security and liberty implications of each model. Table 1
EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES AGAINST TERRORISM: GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, supra note 160, at 239-40.
180. Paul Gallis, European Counterterrorist Efforts Since September 11: Political Will and Diverse
Responses, in EUROPE AND COUNTERTERRORISM 36 (Kristin Archick ed., 2003).
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summarizes the characteristics of each model based on these variables. In the next
section, I will discuss the history and development of the counterterrorist policies
in the United States, Israel, and India paying attention to how the policies
employed by these countries reflect the choices they make between these models.
Model Key Features Collectivity Accountability Timing
Criminal Legal definitions, Specific Open Reactive
Justice criminal prosecution,
statutory penalties,
changes in evidentiary
rules
Extradition, diplomatic
sanctions
Intelligence infiltration of groups, Specific Secret Proactive
disruption of plans,
targeted assassination,
secret trials
War pre-emptive or Group Secret decision- proactive
retaliatory strikes, making; public
profiling, immigration awareness
control
Table 1
Il. COMPARING APPROACHES TO COUNTERTERRORISM
Earlier, I discussed the criminal justice, intelligence, and war models of
counterterrorism. Each model reflects choices that a country makes about the
nature of the terrorist threat, the risk of harm, and choices of how to balance the
need for security with the desire for liberty. In addition, the models are not
mutually exclusive, nor do all of their features fit neatly into the variables of
accountability, collectivity, and timing. However, these models are a useful
analytical tool for categorizing a country's approach. In this section, I discuss the
counterterrorist policies of the United States, Israel, and India. I will begin each
analysis with a history of the conflicts underlying the terrorism. Next I will
discuss counterterrorist polices adopted by each country, including statutory
provisions. Finally, I will discuss any changes in each country's policy since the
attacks of September 11, 2001.
A. United States
In many ways, the United States is not a good case for studying
counterterrorist policy. The United States is different from the other examples in
this study in several ways, which affect the way its counterterrorist policies should
be viewed. First, although terrorist organizations have a specific set of grievances,
anti-American terrorism cannot be traced to a specific conflict in the same way that
the other cases in this study can. Terrorism in India is facet of various ethnic and
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regional conflicts. Anti-Israel terrorism is the result of either Israel's existence
(which upon creation, it is argued, forced Palestinians from their rightful lands), or
Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories, depending on one's point of view. In
contrast, anti-American international terrorism is at best defined as the result of a
"clash of civilizations", a concept which was described by Samuel Huntington in
1996. 181 Under this view, anti-American terrorism is an assault against the West,
with America as its hegemon. A variation on this argument is that anti-American
terrorism is the result of globalization, with the United States as the leader in a
neo-liberal Westernization at the hands of multinational corporations. 182 But even
if one does not subscribe to this assessment, anti-American terrorism is the result
of a set of grievances that while definable, is best described as a vague notion of
"American foreign policy."' 83  The United States is the only country in this
analysis, therefore, where terrorism is not a facet of another discreet conflict.
Second, anti-American terrorism is unique because of the American role in world
politics. Because of American power, its counterterrorist policies play a
significant role in influencing the way other perceive U.S. counterterrorist
policies. American action sets precedent, thereby legitimating otherwise
unjustified acts.184 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, terrorism does not pose
the same threat to the state as does terrorism in India and Israel. In the case of
Israel, terrorist organizations such as Hamas have asserted that their objective is
not merely the end of a set of discrete Israeli policies, but rather then elimination of
Israel itself.185 In the case of India, while terrorist organizations have not sought
the destruction of the State, Indian government policies in Jammu and Kashmir are
the result of Indian fears about the destruction of secularism which is at the core of
Indian identity.' 86  In contrast, while terrorism is a threat to the safety of
Americans, few would argue that the State itself is threatened by anti-American
terrorism. Rather, in the case of the United States, the threat to the State comes not
from terrorism, but the response to terrorism.
History
Anti-American terrorism first became a concern of the U.S. government in the
1970s when terrorists began engaging in hijackings, assassinations, bombings, and
hostage takings aimed at U.S. interests.' 87 Between 1968 and 1986, the number of
181. See generally, SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF THE WORLD ORDER (1996). See also DOUGLAS KELLNER, FROM 9/11 TO TERROR WAR: THE
DANGERS OF THE BUSH LEGACY 28 (2003).
182. See KELLNER, supra note 181, at 29; see also Wedgwood, supra note 2, at 329.
183. This should not however, be taken imply that the terrorists grievances are ill-defined or
illegitimate.
184. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 44.
185. See generally, Hamas, Charter, in ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST 54
(Barry Rubin & Judith Colp Rubin eds., 2002).
186. See SuMANTRA BOSE, KASHMIR: ROOTS OF CONFLICT, PATH TO PEACE, 8 (2003); see also
infra note 418 and accompanying text (noting that the secession of the Muslim majority Jammu and
Kashmir would be to concede that a secular India is not possible). The same argument can be extended
to separatists in other areas such as Punjab.
187. Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 23.
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anti-American attacks increased from 54 to 139.188 However, as mentioned earlier,
unlike in the case of Israel and India, anti-American terrorism cannot be traced to a
discrete conflict. Rather is the result of a more vague policy orientation of the U.S.
government. Anti-American terrorism can be broken down into two categories:
domestic and foreign.
First, anti-American domestic terrorism generally refers to a wave of anti-
government terrorism that grew and then faded away in the 1990s. Such domestic
terrorist groups generally subscribed to extreme right-wing philosophies, and
sought to destroy the power of the federal government of the United States.'
89
These philosophies were interwoven with millennial fears and also involved white-
supremacist and isolationist ideologies. 190 In 1998, total membership in these
militias was estimated to be between ten and fifteen million, with 100,000 active
members.' 9' Public awareness of such groups peaked in the mid-1990s after the
bombing of the Alfred R. Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City in
April, 1995.192 After an initial backlash against Arab-Americans, it was
discovered that the bombing was perpetrated by domestic terrorists who were
subsequently arrested and charged criminally. 193  Today, however, domestic
terrorism is seemingly an insignificant threat, because the events of September 11
have overshadowed the domestic terrorist threat. But while domestic terrorism is
of minor significance today, it does provide context for some of the legislation
discussed in this study, while also providing a useful point of comparison for
policies adopted since September 11.
Of more interest to this analysis is the history of foreign terrorism against the
United States. Such foreign terrorism has predominantly come from extremist
Islamist groups, who many argue are reacting to a history of intervention in the
affairs of the Muslim world. 194 First, as Kellner notes the United States intervened
in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and in the 1980s after the Soviet invasion.
195
After providing billions of dollars of support to the Afghan resistance, however,
the U.S. government under George H.W. Bush withdrew entirely from
Afghanistan, allowing a civil war to ensue that subsequently led to the rise of the
Taliban. 96 Second, U.S. tolerance for the authoritarian regime in Saudi Arabia in
pursuit of oil interests has caused significant Muslim anger at the United States. 197
Third, the role of the U.S. government in imposing sanctions against Iraq after the
1991 Gulf War, which subsequently led to a significant humanitarian crisis, has
188. Id. at 24.
189. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 14, at xxvii.
190. Id.; see also Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 32.
191. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at xxvii.
192. See, e.g., John Kifner, Terror In Oklahoma City: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at
Al.
193. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Terror In Oklahoma: Arab Reaction; Bitterness Over Early Finger-
Pointing Toward the Middle East, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1995, at BIO.
194. Caleb Carr, A War on all Terrorism, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 1, 2004, at J-3.
195. KELLNER, supra note 181, at 118.
196. Id. at 31-33.
197. Id. at 37.
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also been cited as a cause of significant anti-American sentiment. 98 Fourth,
American support for Israel over the matter of Palestine is widely cited grievance
of terrorists groups which target the United States.' 99 While President George W.
Bush had refused to meet with Yasir Arafat,2° for example, Israel continued to
receive more foreign aid than all of sub-Saharan Africa. 20 1 Finally, some have
argued that U.S. inaction (or late action) in the Balkans, Chechnya, and Kashmir is
widely seen as the result of a hypocritical U.S. foreign policy which is indifferent
to the concerns of Muslims.
20 2
Islamist terrorist groups engaged in several acts of terrorism in the 1970s and
1980s. For example, 1979, revolutionaries seized the U.S. Embassy in Teheran
and took 52 diplomats hostage.20 3 Other incidents during the 1980s include the
bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983,204 the hijacking of the Achillo
Lauro in the Mediterranean in 1985,205 and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
over Scotland in 1988.206 Major incidents continued in the 1990s, including: the
first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993;207 the bombing of the Khobar
towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996;208 and the simultaneous bombings of U.S.
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar al Salaam, Tanzania in 1998.20  In October
2000, terrorists bombed the U.S.S. Cole while it was at port in Yemen.2 0 Finally,
on September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four airliners over the United States and
crashed them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and outside Shanksville,
Pennsylvania.2 1i
198. ABUKHALIL, supra note 170, at 45.
199. Id. at 40.
200. Id. at 39.
201. Id. at 34. Since the passing of Yasir Arafat, the Bush Administration has made greater efforts
to work with the new elected Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas. See "Ariel Sharon Meets with
America's George Bush", The Economist, April 16, 2005.
202. See, e.g., Symposium: Islam, Muslims and Terrorism: Secret Evidence and Guilt by
Association, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. INT'L. L. 589 (2001).
203. John Kifner, Hostage Deal: Gap is Narrow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1980, at A .
204. Thomas L. Friedman, Beirut Death Toll At 161 Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1983, at Al.
205. Robert D. McFadden, Terror In 1985: Brutal Attacks Tough Response, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
1985, at Al.
206. Sheila Rule, Powerful Bomb Destroyed Pan Am Jet Over Scotland, British Investigation
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1988, at Al.
207. Robert D. McFadden, Explosion at the Twin Towers: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
1993, at 1.
208. Philip Shenon, 23 U.S. Troops Die in Truck Bombing at Big Saudi Base, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
1996, at Al.
209. James C. McKinley Jr., Bombings in East Africa: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1998, at
A].
210. John F. Bums & Steven Lee Myers, The Warship Explosion: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2000, at Al.
211. N.R. Kleinfield, U.S. Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers And Hit Pentagon in Day
of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
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Legislation
A complex array of statutes have governed U.S. counterterrorist policy.
Notably, through the 1970s and 1980s, Congress enacted a series of acts which
strengthened the ability of federal agencies to fight terrorism. In 1974, Congress
passed the 1984 Antihijacking Act and the Air Transportation Security Act which
gave the FAA authority over aircraft terrorism. 212 In 1984, Congress passed the
Act to Combat International Terrorism, giving the Department of Justice and the
Federal Buearu of Investigation (FBI) more direct authority to investigate and
prosecute those who commit crimes against Americans abroad.213 In addition, the
Omnibus Antiterrorism Act of 1986 made terrorist acts against Americans abroad a
federal crime, permitting arrest overseas for trial in U.S. courts.21 4
Congress also passed several acts which were designed to deal with the
problem of state sponsored terrorism. In 1979, Congress passed an amendment to
the Export Administration Act, "[which] call[ed] for the secretary of state to
annually designate states that consistently support terrorism. ' '215  This law,
combined with others, allowed the U.S. to impose sanctions against "state
sponsors" of terrorism. 216 The Anti-terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act
of 1989 prohibits arms exports to states designated as state sponsors of
terrorism.217 States designated as state sponsors of terrorism include Libya, Iran,
Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba.2" 8
With regard to investigation of terrorist organizations domestically, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), allows investigators to seek warrants
from a secret FISA court when the purpose of the warrant is to gather foreign
intelligence. 219  Unlike criminal warrants, which were governed by standards
promulgated in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 220 FISA
warrants can be issued without probable cause of a crime as long as the
government can show probable cause that the primary purpose of the warrant is to
212. J. Brent Wilson, The United States' Response to International Terrorism, in TIHE DEADLY SIN
OF TERRORISM: ITS EFFECT ON DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY IN SIX COUNTRIES, supra note 23, at
186.
213. Id.; see 1984 Act To Combat International Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 98-533, 98 Stat. 2706.
214. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 3071(a)-
(c), 100 Stat. 853.
215. Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 29.
216. Id.
217. Wilson, supra note 212, at 187.
218. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, STATE SPONSORS OF TERORISM, available at
www.state.gov/s/ct/c1415 l.htm (last visited April 18, 2005).
219. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102, 92 Stat. 1783.
220. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 2516, 2518(4)-
(5), 82 Stat. 197, 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994)).
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gather intelligence against a foreign power including foreign terrorist
organizations.22' Since its inception in 1978, this court has issued more than ten
thousand FISA warrants, and has denied only one.222
After the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).223 The Act has several provisions
not directly related to counterterrorism policy, including provisions amending
habeas corpus procedures generally. 224  With respect to counterterrorist efforts,
AEDPA first had several provisions which were designed to discourage state
support of terrorist groups.225 For example, the statute establishes jurisdiction in
U.S. courts for civil suits against states that sponsor terrorism by creating an
exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity.22 6  In addition, the Act
prohibits military and other assistance to state sponsors of terrorism. 227 Second,
the Act requires the Secretary of State to designate certain groups as "Foreign
Terrorist Organizations" (FTOs).228 Among other things, such a designation
allows the government to freeze the assets 229 and criminalize support to such
organizations. 230  Third, the act provides for a procedure for removal, exclusion,
and denial of asylum to alien terrorists. 23 1 Finally, the act contains significant
criminal provisions related to counterterrorist efforts. These include the
221. The ability of the government to use FISA warrants against terrorist groups has substantially
increased via the USA-Patriot Act because FISA was amended to require a "significant" purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence rather than a primary purpose. See infra notes 267-276 and
accompanying text.
222. Philip Shenon, Traces of Terror: Counterintelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at Al. The
lone denial occurred in a ruling made public in August 2002, where the court ruled that amendments to
FISA under the USA-Patriot Act were unconstitutional. This ruling was later overturned by a secrete
FISA appellate court in an ex parte proceeding. See generally, Ann Beeson, On the Home Front: A
Lawyer's Struggle to Defend Rights after 9/11, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS, supra note 169, at 307-
11 (discussing that the lone denial occurred in a ruling made public in August 2002, where the court
ruled that amendments to FISA under the USA-Patriot Act were unconstitutional. This ruling was later
overturned by a secret FISA appellate court in ex parte proceedings.)
223. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
[hereinafter AEDPA].
224. Id. §§ 101-108.
225. Id. §§ 310-330.
226. Id. § 221.
227. Id. §§ 325-327.
228. Id. § 302(a)(1).
229. Id. § 302(a)(2)(C).
230. Id. § 303(a)(1).
231. Id §§ 401, 411, 413-14.
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prohibition on providing assistance to FTOs, 232 engaging in financial transactions
with state sponsors of terrorism,233 criminal sanctions related to developing
biological weapons 234 and plastic explosives, 235 and a range of enhanced penalties
related to acts of or conspiracies to engage in terrorism.
236
Executive Action
While of course always present, use of the military and intelligence apparatus
in American counterterrorist efforts was limited through the 1990s. For example,
former President Richard Nixon employed a "collective security" approach which
relied on cooperation with other states to encourage extradition and prosecution of
suspects.237 The administrations of former Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy
Carter followed a substantially similar approach,238 with the latter focusing
substantially on root causes of terrorism.239 The Reagan Administration focused
slightly more on a military approach, however, with CIA director William Casey
referring to international terrorism as a "war without borders."2 40 This policy most
notably included the bombing of Tripoli in 1986.241 Former President Ronald
Reagan also established a policy of pre-emptive military action. 242 Ultimately,
however, use of the military through the Reagan Administration was limited, with
former Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Nixon, and Carter launching no punitive
military attacks, while former Presidents Ford and Reagan launched only one
each.243
President William Jefferson Clinton Administration's use of force, while
greater, was also limited. After it was discovered that Iraqi intelligence officials
were responsible for an assassination attempt on President George H.W. Bush,
President Clinton launched missile attacks against Iraqi military installations.244
President Clinton launched another missile attack against Sudan after the 1998
embassy bombings.245
The emphasis of the Clinton administration in the 1990s was on the use of
legal mechanisms to deter terrorism. In describing U.S. counterterrorist policy, for
example, Phillip C. Wilcox Jr., former U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism
232. Id. § 303(a)(1).
233. Id. § 321(a).
234. Id. § 511.
235. Id. §§ 604, 605(c).
236. Id. §§ 701-704.
237. See Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 315; see also Wilson, supra note 212, at
183-84.
238. See Wilson, supra note 212, at 184-85.
239. See Twenty-Year Balance, supra note 76, at 315.
240. Id. at 316.
241. Id.
242. National Security Decision Directive 138 (Apr. 26, 1984); Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 44.
243. Turner, supra note 124, at 228.
244. Douglas Jehl, Iraqi Tells F.B.I. He Led Attempt to Kill Bush, US. Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 1993, at A 1; Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 44.
245. Steven Lee Myers, Bin Laden Plot Reported Against US. Sites in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1998, at A3; Wilcox, supra note 124, at 44-45.
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under the Clinton Administration argues that the seven pillars of U.S. policy
include a substantial focus on terrorism as a crime, the use of apprehension of
terrorists for deterrence, the use of diplomacy to bring terrorists to justice, and the
use of sanctions to isolate states that harbor terrorists. 246 For example, in 1997 the
Clinton Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, which stated that
the United States will support counterterrorist efforts by increasing cooperation
with foreign governments and effectuating deterrence through arrest and criminal
prosecution.247 Notable prosecutions during the Clinton Administration include:
the perpetrators of the first World Trade Center bombing, such as Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman248 and Ramsi Youssef, with the latter being prosecuted after
considerable efforts to arrest him in Pakistan; 249 and the indictment of fourteen
members of the Saudi Hizballah in June 1996 for the bombing of the Khobar
Towers.2 5 0  Finally, although FISA substantially lowered the burden of proof
required when investigators sought warrants intended to gather intelligence on
foreign terrorist organizations, the Clinton Administration continued to employ a
higher criminal standard when choosing to apply for those warrants. 251 Thus, even
when it was not required to do so, the Clinton Administration emphasized
counterterrorist efforts within traditional criminal justice principles.
Post - September 11 Developments
September 11 changed counterterrorist policies in many countries, and no
where is this more apparent in the United States. The scale of the attacks was
without precedent in the realm of sub-state terrorism, and occurred on American
soil. It was widely reported that the flights that crashed in Pennsylvania and into
the Pentagon were intended to crash into the Whitehouse and Capitol. 2  President
Bush spent most of the day flying to and from secure locations, and Vice President
Cheney subsequently resided in an undisclosed location so as to keep the President
and Vice President in separate places.2 " In short, the United States entered a crisis
mode from which in some ways it has yet to come out. Congress enacted several
pieces of legislation in the months following the attacks. These include: the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act;254 the Bioterrorism Response Act of
246. Wilcox, supra note 124, at 25.
247. PDD-39, June 21, 1999, in SUPERTERRORISM 21 1-13 (Yonah Alexander & Milton Hoenig
eds., 2001).
248. See Richard Bernstein, Bomb Trial Transcripts of Phone Calls Add Pieces to Evidence Pile,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, § 1 at 35.
249. James C. McKinley Jr., Bomb Plot, Chapter 3: Enter an Accused Master of Terrorism, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at BI.
250. Neil MacFarquhar, Package Bomb Kills American in Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001,
at A6.
251. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM, COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 12 (2000) [hereinafter Bremer Commission Report].
252. Roy Eccleston, Terrorists had Bush in Their Sights, THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 14, 2001, at 3;
Anastasia Hendrix, Flight Delay Gave Passengers Time to Act, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 20, 2001, at A3.
253. Mike Allen, Cheney's Vanishing Act Sparks Curiosity, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2001, at A4.
254. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)
(establishing the Transportation Security Administration within the Department of transportation and
providing for additional enhancements to transportation security).
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2001;255 the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002;256 the
Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2001 ;257 and the Victims of
Terrorism Relief Act of 200128 The most important piece of legislation, however,
was the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot).259 Due
to a fear of further attacks, the bill was considered on an accelerated timetable,
bypassing both the committee process and floor debate, and was ultimately passed
by wide margins (357-66 in the House and 98-1 in the Senate).26 °
USA Patriot has several components that are intended to improve the ability
of the domestic security apparatus to prevent further attacks. First, the Act
attempts to remove barriers to cooperation between the intelligence and law
enforcement communities. 261 Historically, due to legal and political barriers, law
enforcement and intelligence agencies in the United States did not sufficiently
cooperate in furthering counterterrorist efforts.262 While political barriers could
not be resolved legislatively, USA Patriot seeks to remove legal barriers to
cooperation by authorizing increased information sharing between agencies. 263 For
example, the Act modifies grand jury rules to allow disclosure of historically secret
grand jury testimony to federal officials without a court order.26 It also more
generally allows information sharing between law enforcement, intelligence,
immigration, and national security officials.265
Second, the Act has several provisions which increased the domestic
surveillance capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence officials. 266  For
example, the Act includes provisions which expanded the use of FISA to include
the use of pen registers, trap and trace devices, 267 and roving wiretaps. 268 These
255. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-188, §§ 101, 321-36, 116 Stat. 594 (providing for improvements to readiness levels for bioterrorist
threats, including training for emergency responders, and protection of the drug supply).
256. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, §§ 201-
204, 301-309, 116 Stat. 543 (making miscellaneous improvements to information sharing between
federal agencies regarding visa applications).
257. Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat.
721 (implementing the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings to
strengthen criminal laws relating to terrorist bombings and the financing of terrorism).
258. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, §§101-105 115 Stat. 2427
(amending the Internal Revenue code to provide tax relief for victims of the terrorist attacks against the
United States).
259. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter
Patriot Act].
260. See Michael T. McCarthy, The USA Patriot Act, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 435,435 n.7 (2002).
261. Patriot Act § 203.
262. McCarthy, supra note 260, at 440.
263. Id. at 439.
264. Patriot Act §§ 203(a)(1)(C)(i)-(iii).
265. Id. at § 203(b).
266. Id. at §§ 201-202, 204, 206, 209, 214, 216-217, 225.
267. Id. § 214; McCarthy, supra note 2603, at 446 (explaining that pen registers and trap and trace
devices record the date time, and telephone numbers of incoming and outgoing calls, but not the content
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provisions are uncontroversial, however, because many of these capabilities were
already available for criminal investigations.269 Of greater controversy is the
expansion of the definition of pen registers, and trap and trace devices to include
devices which allow the tracking of e-mail and Internet usage. Civil libertarians
argue that this is a significant expansion in the government's surveillance
authority, which requires a significant faith in the government not to use such
information for improper purposes.27' Moreover, although the monitoring
authority was not extended to the "content" of an e-mail, "content" remained
undefined (for example in the case of e-mail subject lines).
272
The surveillance capabilities of the government were also substantially
increased through an expansion of the ability of investigators to obtain FISA
warrants.273 As discussed earlier, FISA authorized wiretaps where the purpose of
the tap was to obtain intelligence about a foreign power (including a terrorist
organization).274 USA Patriot changed the word "purpose" to "significant
purpose" in the FISA warrant requirement.275 As a result, the lower standards of
the FISA requirement could be applied where the government intended the
information to be used in a criminal investigation, as long as there was also a
11276On ctb"significant purpose" of gaining intelligence information. On October 31,2001,
Attorney General Ashcroft ruled that the government may also eavesdrop on phone
calls between lawyers and clients if there was "reasonable suspicion" to justify
such an action.277
Third, the Act also increases the surveillance capabilities of the government in
the area of financial transactions. Prior to September 11, international financing
and money laundering for terrorist networks was widely regarded as a significant
problem.278 To correct for this, USA Patriot requires banks to monitor and report
suspicious transactions.279 Such reports are to be shared by the Treasury
Department to the intelligence and law enforcement communities. 28 0 The Act also
2811
provides for government access to credit records without notification.
of the calls).
268. Patriot Act § 206; see McCarthy, supra note 260, at 445 (explaining that roving wiretaps
authorize wiretaps on any phone that a target may use, making individuals, not the equipment the object
of a warrant).
269. See McCarthy, supra note 260, at 445.
270. Patriot Act § 216(a)(3).
271. McCarthy, supra note 260, at 444-46.
272. Id. at 446.
273. Id. at 444-45.
274. Id. at 445.
275. Patriot Act § 218.
276. See generally Beeson, supra note 222, at 307-11 (noting that this provision of FISA was found
constitutional by an appellate FISA court in November 2002; it was the first time a FISA court opinion
'was released to the public).
277. KELLNER, supra note 181, at 101.
278. McCarthy, supra note 260, at 447.
279. Id. at 448.
280. Patriot Act § 358.
281. Id.
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Finally, USA Patriot greatly expands the ability of the government to detain
individuals who have not been convicted of criminal or immigration violations.
Under the AEDPA of 1996 legislation, the government was authorized to detain
and remove aliens convicted of certain crimes. 282  Where their home countries
would not accept them, these convicted persons were detained indefinitely.283
USA Patriot expands power of the government to detain non-citizens suspected of
terrorism for seven days, after which criminal or immigration charges must be
brought.284 However, since the 1996 legislation, indefinite detention is allowed
where the country of origin will not accept a detainee; in effect, USA Patriot
allows for the indefinite detention of aliens suspected of terrorism.
285
USA Patriot is only one facet of a greater move of the U.S. government away
from the democratic principles in counterterrorist efforts. While USA Patriot
allows for the indefinite detention of aliens suspected of terrorism where their
country of origin will not accept them, in several cases, the government has
exerted this authority in the case of U.S. citizens suspected of terrorist activity.
For example, Yasser Hamdi is an American citizen who was captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan and is currently being detained in a military brig, having
been designated an "enemy combatant" by the government.2 86 In another case,
Jose Padilla (an American citizen born in Brooklyn), was arrested by federal
agents in May 2003 at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago.287 Padilla stands
accused of planning to detonate a "dirty bomb" on American soil. 288 The U.S.
government has held Padilla in solitary confinement, without trial and without
access to a lawyer.289 The case of Mr. Padilla demonstrates the worst fears of civil
libertarians: a citizen, born in the United States, accused of committing a crime in
the United States, and arrested on American soil, cannot avail himself of the
criminal justice system because the government accuses him of being a terrorist.
290
282. AEDPA §§ 422-423
283. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688-89 (2001).
284. Patriot Act § 412.
285. See McCarthy, supra note 260, at 449. The indefinite detention of those suspected of
terrorism is in fact exactly what the Bush Administration originally proposed under USA Patriot. See
Patriot Act § 412.
286. See Neil A. Lewis, Court Affirms Bush's Power to Detain Citizen as Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 2003 at, A16. In July 2003, the Fourth Circuit held that Hamdi could not challenge his designation
as an enemy combatant. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and
remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). The court stated that because a wartime president was due great
deference in conducting a fight against terrorism, courts should not question Hamdi's detention as a
result of his designation as an "enemy combatant." Id. at 463 n3. The Supreme Court subsequently
vacated and remanded the Fourth Circuit's opinion, holding that under Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), Hamdi was entitled to notice as to the factual basis for his designation as an enemy
combatant, and to rebut the Government's factual assertions.
287. See William Glaberson, Judges Question Detention ofAmerican, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003,
at A19.
288. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 701 (2d. Cir. 2003).
289. Id. at 700.
290. In 2003, the Second Circuit held that the President's constitutional powers "do not extend to
the detention as an enemy combatant of an American citizen seized within the country away from a
zone of combat." Id. at 724. Furthermore, the court held that the detention of Padilla was in violation of
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Moreover, even in cases where criminal charges have been brought, the
government has indicated that where it is convenient, it is willing to move
prosecution outside the auspices of the criminal justice system. For example, Ali
Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a Qatari student, was charged with lying to the FBI and
credit card fraud. 291  Al-Marri was later designated an enemy combatant and
moved into military custody.292 This case represents the first time an individual
who originally faced criminal charges has been moved into enemy combatant
status.293 In the case of Zacarias Moussaoui the alleged "20th hijacker" in the
September 11 attacks, the U.S. government has indicated a willingness to move the
criminal prosecution to a military tribunal if the courts upheld the Moussaoui's
Sixth Amendment right to prepare a defense by speaking with suspected al-Qaeda
members being held by the government. 294 These examples are consistent with the
Bush administration policy, announced on November 13, 2001, that foreign
terrorists would be tried in military tribunals, rather than criminal courts.2 95 Such
tribunals would be made up of military officers and members of the executive
branch rather than an independent judiciary. Rules of evidence are substantially
relaxed, and the identity of witnesses hidden.296 No civilian judicial review is
available.297
Finally, the administration has used other executive rules to increase its ability
to detain persons in furtherance of its war on terror. For example, the executive
branch has wide discretion in the administration of immigration laws. Since
September 11, the U.S. government has used this discretion for the purposes of
interrogation or incapacitation; for example, by delaying hearings or deportations
for persons who have technically violated visa regulations.298 Another technique
involves the use of material witness warrants to detain individuals who are a part
the Non-Detention Act, which provides that, "no citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by
the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." d.at 718. The Second Circuit specifically
rejected the argument that the Congress authorized the detention in its authorization of the use of force
following the September 11 attacks. Padilla, 352 U.S. at 724; see also Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)(hereinafter "AUMF"). The 4th Circuit,
however, used the AUMF to justify Hamdi's detention in light of the Non-Detention Act. Hamdi, 316
F.3d at 467-68; 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2004). This position was subsequently adopted by the Supreme
Court in the Hamdi case. 124 S.Ct at 2640. In March 2005, a federal judge held that Mr. Padilla's
detention was not authorized by the AUMF, and order Mr. Padilla released. See Padilla v. Hanfi, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2921 (February 28, 2004).
291. Eric Lichtblau, Man Held as 'Combatant' Petitions for Release, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2003, at
A18.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See Philip Shenon, U.S. to Appeal Ruling on 9/11 Terror Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at
A28.
295. Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1407, 1410 (2002). See
also Wedgwood, supra note 2, at 331 (noting the benefits of using military tribunals to try suspected al
Qaeda terrorists, and the legal basis for doing so).
296. Dickenson, supra note 295, at 1415.
297. Id. at 1417-18.
298. Id. at 1414.
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of a large and indefinite class of prospective grand jury witnesses.2 9 Both of these
techniques have been used to reach a broad class of individuals who may be
connected to terrorism, in order to reach a narrow class of individuals for whom
probable cause exists. Using these techniques, the Bush Administration had
arrested or detained over 1200 persons, mostly Muslim or Arab, by November
2001,300
Internationally, the policy of the U.S. government since the September 11
attacks has been to emphasize the proactive use of military force to deter and
prevent terrorist attacks.3 °1 With regard to the specific class of terrorists, the
Government has engaged in several actions which demonstrate a move away from
the use of law to prevent terrorism. First, as discussed already, President Bush
signed an executive order providing for the trial of terrorists in military
tribunals.30 2 In the case of combatants captured in Afghanistan, the United States
detained these combatants at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
30 3
These combatants were, according to the Bush Administration, "unlawful
combatants," occupying a gray area between laws-neither prisoners of war
protected by the Geneva Conventions, nor criminals subject to the benefits of the
U.S. criminal justice system.3 4 Second, the United States has captured terrorists
off the battlefield, via efforts on the part of the intelligence community along with
cooperation with foreign governments. For example, the United States captured
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, a top Al-Qaeda operative in Pakistan in March
2003.305 However, in contrast to terrorists captured in very similar circumstances
in the 1990s, such as Ramzi Youssef (participant in the 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing), Mohammad remains in the custody of the intelligence community, and
has yet to be charged with a crime.306 Finally, in some cases, the United States has
engaged in a policy of targeted assassination of terrorists suspects. For example, in
November 2002, it was widely reported that a Predator drone had been used to
assassinate al Qaeda operatives in Yemen. 30 7 While prior to September 11 there
was a substantial debate within the U.S. government as to the merits of such
action, 308 apparently that debate was resolved in favor of assassination.
299. Id. The grand jury has historically been controlled by prosecutors with limited judicial
oversight. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
300. KELLNER, supra note 181, at 101.
301. See Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 57.
302. Dickinson, supra note 295, at 1410.
303. Id. at 1415.
304. KELLNER, supra note 181, at 178. See also Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1142-43
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
305. David Johnston, Raid on Feb. 13 Smoothed Way in Qaeda Arrest, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 4, 2003,
at Al.
306. Kamran Khan, Al-Qaida Strategist Arrested, ContraCostaTimes.com, (Mar. 2, 2003), at
http://www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/5300268.html.
307. David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Fatal Strike in Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out by
Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at A16.
308. Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 38.
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More generally, the United States has declared a policy of pre-emptive
military strikes in order to deter future attacks. The administration first employed
a broad based military operation as part of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.
President Bush's statement to the public on the day that war began made it clear
that this conduct was part of the "war on terror., 30 9  Later, the administration
announced the so called "Bush Doctrine" of pre-emptive military strikes on states
that pose an imminent threat to the United States.31 ° Subsequently, the United
States launched an invasion of Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. The
justifications for this pre-emptive war were varied. The administration discussed
Saddam Hussein's support for terrorist groups (though never specifically stating
that Saddam Hussein was connected to the September 11 attacks). 311  The
administration also discussed the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein, under
which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis had been killed.312 Most notably, the
administration argued that the Iraqi regime had continuously tried to develop
weapons of mass destruction in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolutions.313
Such weapons posed an "imminent risk" to American security because they could
be provided to terrorists targeting the United States. 314 Subsequent to the end of
major fighting in Iraq, the Bush Administration declared that Iraq was now the
"central front" in the war on terror (seemingly because international terrorists who
descended upon Iraq oppose the U.S. presence there).3t 5 Thus, while the
connection between Iraq and terrorism is debatable to many, the war in Iraq was
almost certainly a part of the U.S. government's "war on terror.",
316
B. Israel
Terrorism has plagued the territory that is today Israel since before the
creation of that State. Particularly after the September 11 attacks, Israeli policy is
viewed by many as a useful model for emulation.317 However, the Israeli terrorism
experience differs from the American experience in several ways. First, and most
importantly, unlike the United States, since its creation, counterterrorist policy has
been a critical aspect of Israel's security structure.3 8 This is because, unlike in
other countries, the object of many groups that target Israel is to destroy the state
309. Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban
Military Installations in Afghanistan, (Oct. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/print/20011007-8.html.
310. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Sept. 17, 2002) at 15,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
311. Address Before a Joint Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-19.html.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, 5 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/progress/full.html.
316. Whether it should have been part of that war is, of course, another question.
317. Noemi Gal-Or, Countering Terrorism in Israel, in THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM, supra
note 23, at 146.
318. Id.
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itself.319 Second, while the United States has confronted issues of state sponsored
terrorism, the role of other Arab states in anti-Israel terror is particularly poignant.
Anti-Israel terror by Palestinian militants was often a low-cost proxy war being
waged by Arab states against Israel, in which Arab states could attack Israel, while
avoiding risking the lives of their own nationals. 320 Finally, while there is a steady
stream of attacks against both the United States and Israel, the United States has
not faced a situation comparable to the Intifada which rose in 1987, or more
recently the 2000 al-Aqsa Intifada.32' Many argue that such conditions resemble
insurrections, 322 or a war between two states, 3 23 rather than terrorist campaigns. As
a result, unlike in the American case, anti-Israel terrorism is merely a facet of a
wider conflict. These factors, and the geography of the Middle East itself, yield an
Israeli terrorist experience which is drastically different from that of the United
States.
Historjy
While anti-American terrorism is a response to globalization, or a set of
conditions believed to constitute American foreign policy, anti-Israeli terrorism
can be traced to a discrete issue, namely, the establishment of the state of Israel in
the Middle East. This grievance has since been expanded to include the allegedly
illegal occupation of Arab lands, and Israeli treatment of Palestinians under their
authority.324
After World War I, and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was
entrusted to Great Britain.325  The British opened Palestine up to Jewish
immigration, the subsequent influx of whom led to periodic violence between to
326the two groups. After years of conflict, including violence perpetrated by
Jewish rebel groups such as the Irgun Zvai Leumi (Irgun gang) and the Lohamy
Heruth Israel (LEHI, or Stem Gang), the State of Israel was established on May
14, 1948.327 Immediately, members of the Arab league declared war on the newly
established Jewish state. 321 Conflicts followed in 1956-57, 1967, 1969-1970, 1972,
319. Id. at 145. An Al-Fatah publication, for example, argues that the "The liberation action is not
only the removal of an armed imperialist base, but more important - it is the destruction of a society."
Id. at 13-40 (citation omitted).
320. See Gary C. Gambill, The Balance of Terror: War by Other Means in the Contemporary
Middle East, 28 J. PALESTINE. STUD. 56, (1998). See also, Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 139.
321. See Al-Aqsa Intifada, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Aqsa_Intifada (last modified Nov. 9,
2004) (offering a brief description of the term).
322. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 141.
323. Shlomo Gazit, Israel, in COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 12, at 256.
324. See Kleff, supra note 7, at 18.
325. See British Mandate of Palestine, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British-Mandate_of_Palestine (last modified Nov. 9, 2004) (offering a
brief explanation).
326. Id.
327. See generally TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS & POSSIBILITIES OF
LEGAL CONTROL 11-53 (Henry H. Han ed., 1993).
328. Matthew H. James, Keeping the Peace--British, Israeli, and Japanese Legislative Responses
to Terrorism, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 405, 428 (1997).
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and 1982.329
During the 1950s, Palestinians based in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan staged cross-
border attacks against Israel, which were met with Israeli military operations
against the host governments. 330  The Palestinian Liberation Organization was
founded in 1964, and during the subsequent decades, anti-Israeli terrorism, at the
hands of organizations such as Al-Fatah, or the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) became regular phenomena. 331  Attacks were directed both
internally and externally, most memorably involving the killing of eleven Israeli
athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.332
The conflict was complicated by the Israeli occupation (after their victory
following a pre-emptive strike in the 1967 war), of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza
Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.333 From 1967 to
1974, the Labor government and its Defense minister Moshe Dayan, engaged in a
policy of limiting the Israeli presence in the Occupied Territories in order to curb
animosity towards the occupying force.334 However, with the rise of a government
of the right-wing Likud party in the late 1970s, this policy was reversed in favor of
increased visibility of the Israeli occupation. It included less attention paid to the
treatment of residents of the territories, and the creation of a policy of Israeli
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza strip, which involved expropriation of
uncultivated Arab lands in those territories. 335 These policies eventually
culminated in the first Intafada (popular uprising) in 1987.336
In the 1990s, beginning with talks in Madrid in 1991, a series of peace
agreements nurtured the hope of an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 1993
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres from Israel and
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles (the Oslo
Agreement).337 This along with subsequent agreements such as Oslo I in 1994,
Oslo II in 1995, the Hebron agreement in 1995, the Wye River Memorandums of
1998 and 1999 established and implemented a framework for a lasting 
peace. 338
During this time, the Israeli Defence Ministry reported a greater than 90 percent
decline in terrorism in Israel and the Occupied Territories.33 In September 2000,
with peace talks at a critical juncture, Likud Knesset member Ariel Sharon visited
the Temple Mount, setting of the new Al-Aqsa Intafada.340 The peace talks were
329. Id.
330. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 140.
331. Id. at 141.
332. Gazit, supra note 323, at 231.
333. James, supra note 328, at 428 n123.
334. See Gazit, supra note 323, at 234.
335. Id. at 234-35.
336. Id. at 235.
337. CHASDI supra note 15, at 289.
338. Id. at 287.
339. Gazit, supra note 323, at 238. The number of attacks decline continuously from 3,142 in
1993, to 242 in 1999. The greatest decline was from 1994 (2198) to 1995 (560). Id.
340. See Things Fall Apart, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2000, at 29-30.
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subsequently tabled by Prime Minister Barak in October 2000.34 1  Sharon was
elected to Prime Minister in February 2001.342
Legislation
Like any country, Israel's Penal law is one mechanism to punish terrorism
when the act in and of itself would be criminal,343 and Israeli law permits the death
penalty in cases of terrorism. 344  In addition, unlike American law, Israeli law
makes failure to prevent a felony a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years
imprisonment.345 Such a statute allows for the prosecution of those who do not
directly participate in terrorist acts. Other provisions of the penal law also provide
Israeli courts with extraterritorial jurisdiction in the cases of crimes against
humanity, against the State of Israel, or against Israeli residents or national.346
The most significant legislation, however, is Israel's Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance, enacted in 1948.347 While terrorism is not defined in the Ordinance,
management or membership in a terrorist organization is punishable by
imprisonment up to 20 years or 5 years, respectively. 348 The act also criminalizes
support for a terrorist organization, such as providing money, resources or a place
for a meeting.349 Significantly, the act differs from U.S. law by making advocacy
on behalf of a terrorist organization or the possession of propaganda from a
terrorist organization, criminal offenses punishable by up to a 1000 pound fine and
three years imprisonment.350  A 1980 amendment to the Ordinance also makes
public displays of support, such as displaying a flag or slogan, a criminal act.3 5 1
Finally, the 1948 Ordinance granted broad authority to the military to enforce
many of its provisions.352 For example, the military was granted the authority to
confiscate any property of a terrorist organization,353 and to close down any facility
341. See id. at 31.
342. Sharon's Famous Victory, Barak's Crushing Defeat, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2001, at 47.
343. James, supra note 328, at 435.
344. Gazit, supra note, 323 at 250.
345. Penal Law, 1977, art.262, Laws of the State of Israel Article 262 states: "Every person who,
knowing that a person designs to commit a felony, fails to use all reasonable means to prevent the
commission or completion thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor and is liable to imprisonment for two
years.
346. James, supra note 328, at 435-36.
347. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948).
348. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, §§ 2, 3. Membership in a terrorist organization may be
presumed if a person is present "in a place serving a terrorist organization or its members as a place of
action, meeting or storage." § 9(b).
349. Id. §§ 4(d),(e).
350. Id. §§ 4(a)-(c). Such incitement offenses are extremely limited under U.S. law. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). (noting that "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.")
351. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance Amendment, § 1, 1980, S.H. 187.
352. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, § 6(a).
353. Id. §§ 5(a)-(b).
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which services a terrorist organization or their members.354 Furthermore, offenses
under the statute were to be prosecuted by military tribunals,355 under the
procedures of military courts. 56 Judgments of the military tribunals were
reviewed by the Minister of Defense,357 but not subject to civilian judicial
review. 358 However, the military role was removed when these provisions were
repealed in the 1980 Amendments to the Ordinance.35 9
The final consideration for understanding Israeli anti-terrorist legislation is
the Proclamation on Law and Administration which was made at the time of Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and the, Gaza Strip. The Proclamation is a
continuation of the British Mandate Defense (Emergency) Regulations which were
enacted in 19 4 5 .
360 These regulations granted broad authority to the military to
detain and try suspected terrorists.361 In addition, to serve as a deterrent to a person
who would give shelter to terrorists, the military was given the authority to
demolish homes or dwellings of terrorists caught or killed.362 The legal obligations
in the occupied territories were complicated, however, given the concurrent
applications of Israeli, military, and local law.363 In practice, this led to two justice
systems based on the nationality of the accused, with Jewish Underground
terrorists being tried in Israeli courts, and others being tried in military tribunals.
36 4
Executive Action
The primary responsibility for Israeli counterterrorist policy is placed in one
of Israel's three intelligence services: the General Security Service (GSS, or
SHABAK), the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence Branch, and the Mossad (Israeli
intelligence services).365 In addition to the measures discussed earlier, several
aspects of Israel's domestic security apparatus are worth mentioning here. First,
like in the United States, Israeli investigators have broader investigative
capabilities than are available in regular criminal investigations. For example,
Israel allowed for "investigative arrests" and prolonged interrogations in cases of
political violence. 366 Until recently, these measures were generally not available in
the United States. Moreover, Israel allows its intelligence agencies to act outside
the rules that generally restrict law enforcement personnel as long as the fruits of
their investigation are used by policynakers, rather than as evidence in criminal
354. Id. § 6(a).
355. Id. § 12(a).
356. Id. § 12(d).
357. Id. § 15(a).
358. Id. § 16.
359. See Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment), § 5, 1980, S.H. 187.
360. James, supra note 328, at 436.
361. Gazit, supra note 323, at 251.
362. Id. Israeli courts have ruled that such detention and demolitions are subject to judicial review.
See Heymann, supra note 26, at 95-96. In the U.S., the availability of judicial review for such
detentions is an open question. See e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
363. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 151.
364. Id.
365. Gazit, supra note 323, at 235.
366. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at I11.
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trials.367 This practice comports with U.S practice prior to September 11, but as
discussed earlier, under USA-Patriot, American investigators now operate under
relaxed rules, even if they intend the information to be used in criminal trials.
Related to this is the use of torture by Israeli intelligence officials. The GSS
took primary responsibility in internal security. While their operations were
generally secret, in 1987, their procedures came under scrutiny through an internal
government investigation that became known as the Landau Report. 368 Among
other things, the report found that the GSS had used force to extract information
and confessions from terrorist suspects. 369 The report also found that GSS officers,
with the assistance of military attorneys, had deliberately deceived judges when
suspects had claimed that their confessions were extracted by illegal means. 370 The
report ultimately legitimized psychological tactics, and moderate physical pressure
to extract information, but specifically prohibited torture.37' Israeli courts have
also banned the use of torture in investigations.372
The Israeli security apparatus is also subject to substantially less oversight
than in the American case. As already mentioned, oversight in the case of torture
was made difficult by GSS officers deliberately misleading judges about the use of
torture.373 In another case, in 1984, the government had actively covered up the
role of GSS officers in the killing of two terrorists in their custody.374 The
government took steps to censor press reports of the incident, and the subsequent
internal GSS investigation was classified.375  Eventually, GSS officers were
cleared by an internal disciplinary committee, despite the fact that they were guilty
of murder.376 After the Prime Minister was told of the events, he reprimanded the
officials for giving him information he did not want to hear.377 Eventually, after
the attorney general launched an investigation into the events, four senior GSS
officials were pardoned for their role.37 8  In contrast, in 1995, the CIA under
President Clinton fired two senior officials and reprimanded others after it was
discovered that one of their sources had been involved in the murder of a U.S.
citizen and the husband of another citizen.
379
367. Id. at 140.
368. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel, P.D. 28.
369. Id. at 6-10.
370. See generally id. at 5-10.
371. Id. at 14.
372. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel (Sept. 6., 1999). The Supreme
Court of Israel held that the prohibition against torture is absolute under both Israeli and International
law, noting that there are few exceptions. However, the court did leave open the question whether
investigators subjected to criminal prosecution for torturing a suspect (in order to prevent the loss of
human life, as in the case of a "ticking bomb") may assert a necessity defense. See id. at 29-31, 39.
373. See generally, id. at 5-10.
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377. Id. at 119.
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Finally, internal counterterrorist measures have often led to a visible and large
scale security state in Israel. This policy has already been discussed in the context
of Likud policy in the Occupied Territories in the 1970s.380 The policy has also
included significant target hardening, such as the development of an extensive
security apparatus to protect air traffic to and from Israel.38' In situations where
Israel has found itself with insufficient information to thwart specific attacks, it has
often resorted to "lock-down" mechanisms, involving security screenings in public
places, and the limiting of the freedom of movement, especially the movement of
Palestinians to and from the Occupied Territories. 82 As a result of these measures,
it has been argued that these measures have turned the State of Israel into a
"garrison-police state. 38 3
Israel's counterterrorism policy in the occupied territories was developed and
is implemented primarily by the IDF.384 The policy has generally invoked the use
of maximum force, and involved three general principles:
1) Israeli territory must be sealed up against terrorists; 2) Israel will hit back at
the terrorists no matter where they are; and 3) neighboring and enemy states,
including their civilian populations, that host, tolerate on their soil, and shelter
anti-Israel terrorists cannot evade responsibility and escape being drawn into this
violent circle.
385
This policy manifested itself first in Jordan, where Israeli reprisals led to the
expulsion of Palestinian terrorists in 1970.386 Later retaliations against Syria led to
restrictions by the Syrian government on attacks by Palestinians from within Syria
or the Golan Heights. 387 Finally, after the inability of Lebanon to control attacks
from within its borders (due to civil war in that country), Israel invaded Lebanon in
1982.388 However, some have argued that while this military approach was
understandable in the first decades of Israel's existence (when terrorism was a part
of hostile relations with Arab states), it has been more the result of intuition and
389inertia than strategic calculation in recent years.
Recent Developments
As discussed earlier, in September 2000, a new Intafada erupted in the
380. See Gazit, supra note 323, at 234 and discussion, supra part III.B. "History".
381. Gazit, supra note 323, at 242.
382. Id. at 243.
383. CHASDI, supra note 15, at 288.
384. Combating Terrorism: How Five Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-00-85 (April 2000), at 16-17; see also Gal-Or, supra
note 317, at 147.
385. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 156.
386. Gazit, supra note 323, at 236. This event, known as "Black September," involved a
confrontation between the Jordanian Army and PLO militias, and included Syrian incursions into
Jordan with the assistance of PLO rebels. See id. at 416.n3.
387. Gazit, supra note 328, at 236.
388. See Why Did Israel Invade Lebanon in 1982?, PalestineFacts.com, (last visited Nov. 15,
2004), available at http.www.palestinefacts.com/pfL1967to1991lebanon198x_backgd.php.
389. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 147.
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Occupied Territories after then Knesset member Ariel Sharon visited the Temple
Mount, angering the Arab population.3 9 0 This Al-Aqsa Intafada has changed the
nature of the threat faced by Israel, predominantly in scale. The new threat, it has
been argued, more closely resembles a war between states than a terrorist threat.39'
As a result of these events, peace negotiations ended in October 2000 and Sharon
was elected to Prime Minister in February 2001.392 The immediate effect of these
events from the security perspective is the reversion to the security state
apparatuses referred to earlier. For example, using the military, Israel has created a
large-scale defensive security system throughout the settlements, and
transportation routes to and from them, in the Occupied Territories.393 In addition,
the Israeli Defense Ministry, along with other agencies, has deployed large
numbers of security guards in public areas inside Israel.394
Given this escalation in the year prior, it would perhaps be understandable if
the events of September 11 did not significantly alter the situation in Israel.
Alternatively, decreased American pressure on Israel in light of its own
experiences, may have allowed for an escalation in the Israel. In other words, the
American government was less likely to criticize Israel for responding harshly to
terrorist attacks, either because (a) it substantively "understood" Israel's action; (b)
the American public would not tolerate criticism of Israel as a kindred victim of
terrorist attacks; (c) in light of the Bush Administration's "us/them" binary,
criticism of Israel would be viewed as "siding with the terrorists"; or (d) because
American pressure would have appeared hypocritical in light of America's
response to September 11.
There is some evidence of these escalations in the two years since September
11. For example, after a series of attacks in the spring of 2002, Israel launched one
of its most extensive forays into the Occupied Territories in years.395 The
incursion involved significant casualties on both sides, and included a siege on the
headquarters of Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat.396 The incursions
also involved a significant attack on a Palestinian refugee camp in Jenin, which
was surrounded by rumors of a massacre of up to 500 Palestinian civilians there.397
Ultimately, a United Nations investigation found that there had in fact been no
"massacre" - total casualties numbered 52, with civilian casualties of about 14-
20. 9  Additionally, in spring 2003 after a series of terrorist acts, Israel launched
air strikes against terrorist camps in Syria- the first time Israel forces had
attacked Syria in 30 years.399 Israel has also continued a policy of pre-emptive
390. See Things FallApart, supra note 340, at 29-30.
391. See Gazit, supra note 323, at 256.
392. See Sharon's Famous Victory, Barak's Crushing Defeat, supra note 342, at 47-48.
393. Gazit, supra note 323, at 256-57.
394. See id. at 257.
395. See After the Assault, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2002, at 43.
396. See id.
397. Naught for your comfort, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2002, at 11.
398. Id.
399. Israeli Frustration Versus Syrian Impotence, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at 47.
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military strikes on the Occupied Territories in order to thwart potential terrorist
attacks.40 0 Finally, as an extension of its security state apparatus, in recent months,
the Israeli government finalized plans for a "security fence" to protect Israel
against terrorist attacks.40 1 While the Israeli government has argued that the fence
would keep out terrorists, the fence has been criticized as being a significant
infringement on Palestinian liberty and economic well-being.40 2 In addition, rather
than respecting pre-1967 borders, the fence expropriates large tracts of Arab land
in the Occupied Territories in order to fence in Jewish settlements there.40 3 In sum,
while September 11 did not change Israeli policy, a lack of pressure, combined
with distractions due to the American invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, have
allowed the Israeli government to escalate its responses to terrorist attacks against
Israel. 4°4
C. India
Although receiving less media attention in the United States than anti-
American and anti-Israeli terrorism, anti-Indian terrorism is one of the most
significant threats in the world today. With over one-hundred thousand casualties,
terrorism has taken more lives in India than any other country.405 This threat
exacerbates the seemingly intractable tensions between India and Pakistan, which
have fought three wars since the countries obtained independence in 1947. The
Indian government has repeatedly asserted that anti-Indian terrorism has been both
covertly and overtly supported by Pakistan.4° 6  As in the case of Israel and
Palestine, therefore, terrorist attacks against India have repeatedly subverted the
Indo-Pak peace process.40 7 With the presence of nuclear weapons in both India
and Pakistan, there is a significant threat that terrorist attacks in India may escalate
conflict between India and Pakistan, leading to the possibility of nuclear war on the
Indian sub-continent (a situation which occurred in late 2001 after terrorists
bombed the Indian parliament). 4 8 It is for this reason that President Clinton once
remarked that South Asia is "the most dangerous place on Earth."4° 9 An additional
consideration when thinking about terrorism in India is its relationship to broader
400. Greg Myre, Israelis Kill 3 Hamas Militants and a Young Boy in Ramallah, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 2003, at A8.
401. A Safety Measure or a Land Grab? - Israel's SecurityBbarrier, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at
26.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Since the passing of PA Chairman Yasir Arafat, there appears to have some progress towards
a negotiated settlement in the Middle East. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon recently called for the
elimination of Israeli settlements in Gaza, while the newly elected Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas
has continued efforts to clamp down on anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. See generally, Ariel Sharon
Meets America's George Bush, THE ECONOMIST, April 16, 2005.
405. See Ved Marwah, in COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 12, at 301.
406. Id. at 302.
407. See, e.g., Hope at Last, ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 2004, at 10 (commending recent progress in talks
between Pakistan and India, but noting possibility of deterioration as a result of terrorist attacks).
408. See Eyeball to Eyeball, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2002, at 33.
409. Jeffrey Weiss, India and Pakistan - A Cautionary Tale for Israel and Palestine, 18 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 455, 472 (2003).
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tensions of Indian society. Unlike the predominantly external threat of terrorism in
the United States and Israel, terrorism in India is generally related to separatist
movements resulting from the significant ethnic and religious cleavages within
Indian society.410 These movements, India argues, is in tension with the secular
essence of Indian society. 411 As a result, the threat of terrorism is more than a
threat to human life-it is seen as a threat to the very core of the Indian identity.
History
The major threat of terrorism in India today is that within and related to the
disputed states of Kashmir and Jammu, discussed below. In addition, I will be
discussing terrorist activity related to separatist movements in the state of Punjab
in the 1980s. While this movement is no longer a significant threat in India, it was
the impetus for some of the anti-terrorist legislation discussed. The Punjabi case
also provides a useful point of comparison to current Indian policy.
412
Terrorism in Punjab is related to separatist intentions of Sikhs in Punjab.
Upon independence from Great Britain, India was partitioned into the majority
Hindu state of India and the majority Muslim state of Pakistan (East and West,
with East Pakistan becoming Bangladesh in 197 1).4 13 Smaller religious groups,
including the Sikhs, were not considered in this partition.41 4 As result, partition
resulted in approximately 2.5 million Sikhs being displaced from their homes in
West Punjab (today part of Pakistan). 415 The Indian constitution was also a cause
of significant grievances in the Sikh community because it defined Sikhism as part
of the Hindu religion.416 This clause was viewed as a threat to the separate Sikh
identity.417  In addition, the Indian central government was seen as placing
significant economic burdens on Sikhs, which included the expropriation of land,
the diversion of water, and a reduction in government investment in Punjab.418
After the dismissal of the government of Punjab in 1980, in which the Sikh party
Akali Dal held a majority, the movement turned to terrorism. 419 In 1984, following
series of escalating steps, including Akali Dal's preventing the shipping of Punjabi
wheat and withholding taxes to the central government, India deployed 100,000
troops in Punjab.42 ° In addition, in June, 1984, the Indian government launched
Operation Blue Star a large scale assault against alleged terrorists in Punjab, and
included an attack on the Golden Temple complex (a Sikh religious site), which
410. Marwah, supra note 405, at 301-02.
411. Id. at 311.
412. Although I will not discuss them specifically, additional terrorist movements in India-include
separatist movements in Northeast India (in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Tripura), and in South
India (in Tamil Nadu). Marwah, supra note 405, at 326.
413. BOSE, supra note 186, at 8 & 30.
414. Marwah, supra note 405, at 304.
415. Id.
416. INDIA CONST. art. 25, available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/const.html.
417. Jaskaran Kaur, A Judicial Blackout: Judicial Impunity for Disappearances in Punjab, India,
15 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 269, 270 (2002).
418. Id.
419. Marwah, supra note 405, at 305.
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the Indian government alleged was being used as the headquarters for the terrorist
movement. 421 In response, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was killed by her Sikh
bodyguard in October 1984.422
Following the death of Indira Gandhi, attempts were made at a political
solution to the problems in Punjab.423 On July 25, 1985 a peace accord was signed
by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Akali Dal president Harchand
Singh.424 However, after the Akali Dal came to power as a result of statewide
elections, the central government once again dismissed the state government in
1987.425 More violence followed, and the Indian government responded with a
second assault on the Golden Temple complex in 1988.426 This latter assault,
named Operation Black Thunder, was far more successful, however, and resulted
in no civilian deaths.427 Nevertheless, terrorist attacks continued into their worst
phase after Black Thunder, with nearly ten thousand persons killed from 1988 to
1992.428 In 1992, the Indian government revived the political process and held
statewide elections. This resulted in a significant decline in terrorist activity,
which ended for the most part by 1995.429
The rise and decline of terrorism related to Sikh separatism stands in stark
contrast to terrorism related to Jammu and Kashmir. The region, which has
significant strategic and symbolic value, has been the source of seemingly endless
hostilities between India and Pakistan, both of which claim the territory.430 The
dispute was caused by the undecided fate of Jammu and Kashmir at the time of
partition.43' While the Hindu states of India were partitioned into secular India, the
predominantly Muslim portion of the country was carved into the Islamic state of
Pakistan. However, the status of 562 princely states were left undecided.432 These
included Jammu and Kashmir, which had a predominantly Muslim population, but
a Hindu prince, Maharajah Hari Singh.433 Several states had Muslim rulers and
Hindu majorities as well, but the accession of these states, indeed most states, to
either India or Pakistan was uncontroversial due to territorial contiguity.434
Kashmir, however, shared borders with both India and Pakistan, though its ties to
Pakistan were arguably stronger.435 Before the final disposition of the state could
421. Id.
422. Death of an Empress, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 1984, at 9.
423. India; Is it Peace?, ECONOMIST, July 27, 1985, at 27.
424. Id.
425. Marwah, supra note 405, at 309.
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429. Id. at 310.
430. See Sumit Ganguly & Kanti Bajpai, India and Crisis in Kashmir, 34 ASIAN SURV. 401, 402
(1994).
431. BOSE, supra note 186, at 31.
432. Id. at 30.
433. See id. at 16 (describing origins of the Kashmir conflict).
434. Id. at 16, 30.
435. Id. at 31.
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be decided, violence broke out when Pakistani militants launched an incursion into
western Kashmir in October 1947.436 In an exchange that evidently foreshadowed
the language of the conflict decades later, the government of Kashmir protested,
arguing that Pakistan was supporting the militants, while Pakistan denied support,
arguing that the militants were responding to atrocities perpetrated against the
Muslim population in Kashmir.437 Maharajah Singh sought the assistance of India
in resisting the invasion, and in return, assented to Indian annexation of the
territory.
438
Since 1947, the status of Jammu and Kashmir has been contested by both
parties. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir during that time,
the most recent of which occurred in 1999 after Pakistan launched an incursion
into the Kargil region of the territory.439 In addition, since the late 1980s, Kashmiri
terrorist groups have committed almost continuous acts of violence against Indian
targets. 440 According to the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, from 1989 to 1999
terrorist incidents and Jammu and Kashmir averaged over 3700 incidents per year,
and resulting in an average of over 2100 deaths per year.44 1 Significant incidents
during this time included the kidnapping of the daughter of the Indian Home
Minister in December 1989,44 the kidnapping of Indian Oil Company executive K.
Doraiswamy in 1991,4 3 and the burning down of a Sufi Shrine in Srinigar in
December 1995.444 In 1996, parliamentary elections were revived in Kashmir, and
again in 1998 and 1999. The elections corresponded with some decrease in
violence, though the number of terrorist incidents remains high." 5
Legislation
With ethnic and social cleavages imposing strong pressures on the state, it is
unsurprising that the India has established a complicated legislative and
constitutional framework for dealing with terrorism. Prior to the recent Prevention
of Terrorism Act, enacted in 2002 (discussed later), the most significant anti-
terrorism legislation enacted by the Indian parliament was the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act.44 6  An additional consideration for
understanding the Indian response to terrorism is its preventative detention
legislation, most notably the National Security Act of 1980.447 The Indian design
436. Id. at 33.
437. Id. at 34.
438. Id. at 35-36.
439. Klashmir Again, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1999, at 16.
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446. C.I.S. Supp (1987), The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987 of the
Indian Parliament, New Delhi, 3 Sep. 1987 [hereinafter TADA].
447. The National Security Act of 1980 of the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, Dec. 27, 1980,
available at http://indiacode.nic.in/cgi/nph-
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is draconian in comparison to the American, and reflects the fear of separatism and
communal pressures which are at the heart of the Indian state identity.
448
In 1987, in response to the situation in Punjab, the Indian parliament passed
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA).4 9  TADA is
similar to other counterterrorism laws in providing for definitions and punishments
for various terrorism related activities. First, TADA elaborately defines a terrorist
act to include various threats to life and property which is intended to "strike terror
in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or
to adversely affect harmony amongst different sections of the people. '45°
Interestingly, in addition to acts intended to strike fear, the TADA definition of
terrorist act also included acts intended to "overawe the Government. 'A 5 For both
types of acts, TADA provides for capital punishment if the act results in death or
up to life imprison for other acts. TADA also criminalizes conspiracies and
attempts to commit terrorist acts,452 as well as harboring or concealing a
terrorist, 453 or possessing property derived from terrorist acts.
454
In addition to these basic provisions, TADA also contained various
proscriptions which went beyond its counterparts in the United States. For
example, in addition to proscribing harboring or concealing terrorists, TADA also
criminalized advocating or abetting terrorist acts,455 the latter of which includes the
mere communication or association with terrorists. 456  In addition, TADA
proscribed membership in terrorist groups. Finally, TADA also proscribed various
"disruptive activities," which included not only acts that disrupt the sovereignty or
territorial integrity of India, but also acts which "question" such sovereignty or
territorial integrity, or "support any claim.., directly or indirectly... for the cession
of and part of India, or secession of any part of India from the Union.'A57 Any of
these advocacy crimes were punishable by up to life imprisonment.
TADA also provided for the creation of "Designated Courts" which had
exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of its provisions.458 These courts were
closed to the public, 459 and provided significantly diminished procedural
protections for suspected terrorists. For example, where the potential punishment
rity%20%27%26M%3Dl%26K%3D450%26U%3D1 [hereinafter NSA].
448. See Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental Rights in
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452. Id. § 3(3).
453. Id. § 3(4).
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457. Id. § 4(2). Acts within the meaning of disruptive activity included action taken whether by act
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458. See id. § l1(1). These courts also had supplemental jurisdiction to try ordinary criminal
offences which were connected to crimes under TADA. See id. § 12(1).
459. SHARMA, supra note 172, at 148.
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was not more than three years, the court was authorized to conduct a "summary
trial," though it was free to recall witnesses or rehear a case where circumstances
warranted.4 6° In addition, TADA provided reduced evidentiary burdens in the
Designated Courts, for example, for confessions 46' and eyewitnesses
identifications. 462  Finally, TADA created a presumption of guilt in situations
where arms or explosives were found in the possession of the accused and were
similar to those used in the act, or the accused's fingerprints were found at the
scene or on arms or vehicles used in the act, or where the accused rendered "any
financial assistance to a person accused of or reasonably suspected of [a terrorist
act] ,,463
TADA did create some protections for the accused, including Miranda type
protections for confessions, 464 and the right to appeal. 465 But despite these nominal
protections, TADA was prone to substantial abuse by the Indian government, often
being applied in areas not afflicted by terrorism. 466  Faced with substantial
criticism, the Indian government allowed TADA to expire in 1995.467
In addition to laws such as TADA, the Indian constitution authorizes the
central government to provide for preventative detention in matters related to
foreign affairs, defense, or security. 468 Unlike in the United States, the Indian
preventative detention provisions could be employed without criminal charge.469
Since independence, the Indian parliament has enacted several statutes authorizing
preventative detention, the most recent of which is the National Security Act of
1980 (hereinafter "NSA"). 470 Under the NSA, the Indian Central government, or
any State government, may order the detention of an individual in order to prevent
him or her from acting in a manner "prejudicial to the [defense] of India, the
relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India. '4 7 1 The statute
460. See TADA § 14(2).
461. Id. § 15; see SHARMA, supra note 172, at 148.
462. TADA § 22; see Sharma, supra note 172, at 149.
463. TADA § 21 (emphasis added).
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468. INDIA CONST. sched. 7, list 1, entry 9, available at
http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/const.html. See generally, Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an
Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L.
311,323 (2001).
469. See Jinks, supra note 468, at 326 (noting that the Indian Supreme Court upheld the
Preventative Detention Act of 1950, which provided for preventative detention without criminal
charge). In.the United States, preventative detentions have been held constitutional by the Supreme
Court where criminal charges have been filed. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Arguably, current U.S. government practices could be characterized as preventative detentions, even
though they are the result of immigration violations or material witness's warrants. However, the very
need for the U.S. government to provide such justifications demonstrates that difference between
American and Indian approaches.
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requires detention orders to meet with the same procedural requirements as a
warrant under the ordinary criminal procedure code.472 The statute sets a
maximum detention period of twelve months.473 Under the NSA, some procedural
protections exist for accused persons, though they are ultimately ineffective
safeguards. The detaining authority is required to inform the detainee of the cause
for the detention, 474 and of his or her rights under the constitution.4 75 In addition,
within three weeks of the date of detention, the detention must be reported to an
advisory board476 which is to rule as to whether there is sufficient cause to justify
the detention.477 However proceedings before the advisory board are informal,
with no formal fmdings or rules of evidence, and the accused has no right to
counsel or of confrontation.478 More generally, judicial deference to executive
authorities as to the existence of security risks substantially curtails protections for
detainees under the NSA.479
Executive Action
Beyond these legislative measures, India's counterterrorist policies have
tended to be dominated by its military and paramilitary apparatus. The belief that
Pakistan has both covertly and overtly supported anti-Indian terrorism most likely
form part of the explanation for this phenomenon. In addition, India's
constitutional structure, like the United States's, divides sovereign authority
between the State and Central governments. Law and order has traditionally been
a State issue.480 As a result, the Indian central government has treated terrorism
first as a law and order problem to be dealt with by State governments, and then,
upon deterioration, escalated the conflict by responding with military and
paramilitary forces.48 '
The Indian government's drastic measures in Punjab illustrate this approach
well. In response to the increasing militant violence in Punjab, the Indian Central
government took control of the State in imposed direct rule on the State in 1984.482
In addition, in June 1984, the Indian government launched the infamous
"Operation BlueStar," a wide spread assault on Punjabi militants.483  The
centerpiece of the Operation was an assault on the Golden Temple Complex at
Amritsar.484 The Indian government had alleged that the Golden Temple was
472. Id. § 4.
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being used as a headquarters for Punjabi militants. 48 5 The operation also included
assaults on forty one other sites, and involved the use of seventy thousand troops,
the expulsion of foreign journalists, and the imposition of a statewide curfew.486 In
the end, the government reported the deaths of 493 terrorists and eighty-three army
personnel, although eyewitnesses reported between four thousand and eight
thousand persons killed.487 In addition, over six thousand persons were detained
following the assault, and several thousand more were arrested in operations
throughout Punjab in subsequent months.488
In subsequent years, significant abuses by Indian security forces continued. A
1994 Human Rights Watch report noted that security forces had engaged in
summary executions, and had been issued shoot-to-kill orders.489 In addition,
security forces had conducted mass round-ups and warrantless house-to-house
searches for suspected militants. 490 The use of torture was also condoned by
Indian officials, both as a means of extracting information, and as a form of
reprisal. 491 For example, after one attack on security forces, two hunderd persons
were detained and tortured near Kathunangal.492 Finally, "forced disappearances"
had been widespread in Punjab.493 In general, these policies were not only
tolerated, but encouraged by government officials in India.494 Since 1992, the
separatist violence has been in significant decline, which many believe is the result
of the resumption of political processes and state elections in Punjab.495 Others,
however, have noted continued impunity for human rights abuses there.496
In Kashmir, the response of the Indian government has been even more
severe. Just as in the case of Punjab, following the onset of separatist violence, the
Indian government imposed direct rule on Kashmir in January 1990.4 97 This was
followed by a steady escalation of the conflict between security forces and
militants. In January 1993, for example, nearly forty civilians were massacred
near Sopore by Indian Border Security forces.498 In addition, beginning in 1995,
the Indian government began arming and training local auxiliaries to supplement
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security forces. 499 Regarding these paramilitary units, a 1996 India Today article
noted, "[they have become the] centerpiece of the counterinsurgency operations in
the Valley... Used initially as intelligence sources-to help in flushing-out
operations-they are now also being used as "prowlers": they take part in the
security forces' armed encounters with militants .... 500 By 1999, nearly 400,000
security personnel were deployed by the Indian government in Kashmir. °1
Both military and paramilitary forces have been responsible for gross human
rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir. As in the case of Punjab, these have
included extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, and torture. °2 Security
legislation for the area authorizes shoot-to-kill orders and the destruction of
property.5 3 In addition, there is a widespread incidence of rape of local women at
the hands of Indian security forces and paramilitary groups.5°4 Attacks against
human rights workers and journalists have also been documented.50 5 As in the
case of Punjab, security forces and paramilitary personnel act with impunity in the
region.
°6
Recent Developments
On October 24, 2001, just six weeks after the September 11 attacks, the
Indian government issued the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO). 507
Then, on March 27, 2002, the Indian parliament gave the ordinance permanent
effect by passing the highly controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002
(POTA) to replace the lapsed TADA.50 8 Counter intuitively given the timing of its
passage, POTA was significantly less drastic than TADA, perhaps reflecting the
deep seated criticism that TADA faced during its existence. POTA's basic
provisions were similar to TADA in the definitions of terrorist acts, the
criminalization of support for terrorism, and the proscription of the proceeds of
terrorist acts.5 9 The act also provides for the seizure of property connected to
terrorist activity, 5 0 and requires disclosure to government authorities of financial
transactions. 1
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500. Id.
501. See BEHIND KASHMIR, supra note 497.
502. See generally id. (noting nearly 300 incidences of forced disappearances and the use of torture
to extract information, for reprisal, and to force persons to join counterinsurgency groups).
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507. See President of India, The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, available at
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Like TADA, POTA establishes Special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to
try terrorist offenses and supplemental jurisdiction to try other offenses. 512 Like
the Courts under TADA, the POTA Courts have the authority to try certain
offenses in a summary fashion if the punishment does not exceed three years.5t 3
The requirements for confessions are similar to those in TADA.514 POTA also
places similar presumptions of guilt as under TADA.515 Finally, POTA gives some
protections to the accused, notably by allowing them to consult with counsel.516
Family must also be notified whenever someone is arrested under the Act.
517
POTA departs from TADA in establishing a procedure for the declaration of
terrorist organizations under the Act.518  Membership in such organization is
criminalized, as is providing support to such organizations. 519  The Act also
establishes a procedure for organizations wishing to challenge their status as
terrorist organizations.52 ° In addition, POTA is substantially different from TADA
in allowing for interception of electronic communications. Like the Patriot Act,
POTA is designed to expand the investigatory powers of the state to take into
account changing technology.52' POTA requires investigators to apply to a
Competent Authority, rather than a judicial officer, for a warrant to intercept
electronic communications if there is reason to believe a terrorist act will occur.
522
The dominant criticism of POTA is that, like TADA, it can be used to arrest
political opposition not engaged in terrorist acts.523 For example, the definition of
terrorist act includes intents not only to threaten the security, but also the "unity"
of India, and incorporates not only acts of violence but "any other means" which
"disrupt services. ' 524 In other words, POTA, if the government so chooses, could
be interpreted to proscribe acts of civil disobedience such as labor strikes. A
Human Rights Watch Report issued in March 2003 noted that POTA had in fact
been used against political opponents and religious minorities. 525  This has
included the arrest of leaders of various political parties not only in Kashmir, but in
the states of Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. 26
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Beyond legislative avenues, September 11 arguably escalated the scope of
India's counterterrorist efforts. The relationship between the September 11 attacks
and Indian counterterrorism efforts is complicated. At one level, many have long
argued that anti-Indian terrorism, especially as related to Kashmir, was part of a
broader Islamic militant movement which conducted attacks against the United
States. 527 The fact that many Kashmiri militants were supported by Pakistan and
were trained in Afghanistan seemed to lend credibility to this argument. Beyond
this, the political milieu of South Asia was drastically changed post-9/ 11. The
United States invasion of Afghanistan in response to the attacks was executed with
the support of the Pakistani government, angering Pakistani hardliners.52' Pakistan
currently continues to support U.S. counterterrorist efforts, for example, in
assisting in the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 529 To the extent that that the
government of Pakistan needs their support, it is safe to assume that an escalation
of the Kashmir conflict would be necessary to appease these hardliners. If
Pakistan, or elements of the Pakistani government, supports anti-Indian terrorism,
as the Indian government claims, there would be an increase in terrorism, and
countermeasures by the Indian government as a response to the American "war on
terror," and now, perhaps, the American invasion of Iraq.
Although perhaps not appropriately described as an escalation, in the year
after those attacks, two episodes demonstrated India's approach to
counterterrorism in the post-9/11 world. First, on December 13, 2001, terrorists
allegedly trained by Pakistan attacked the Indian parliament.53 ° India blamed
Pakistan, and in the weeks that followed, tensions between the two escalated as the
world feared a possible nuclear exchange.5 3 1 Crisis was averted when Pakistan
arrested leaders and followers of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, two
groups India blamed for the attacks.532 Just a few months later, however, this
scenario was repeated when militants in Kashmir attacked an Indian soldier and his
family on May 14, and then an Indian police station on May 30.533 While it is
arguably absurd to risk nuclear attack because of terrorist attacks, both episodes
reflect the reality of Indian counterterrorist efforts-India sees Kashmir related
terrorism as war by proxy. It responds in kind. At the very least, terrorism had
continued to prevent meaningful negotiations for peace because, like Israel, India
continued to argue that negotiations would not occur until acts of violence
ceased.534
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IV. CONCLUSION
After examining counterterrorism in the United States, Israel, and India, we
can attempt to classify each country's policies into one of the three models
discussed earlier, the criminal justice model, the intelligence model, and the war
model. As discussed earlier, each country's policies are categorized using three
variables of analysis which reflect important civil liberties and democratic values:
collectivity, accountability, and timing. Under the criminal justice model,
punishment is exacted in a manner which is most consistent with democratic
values; it is open, reactive, and individualized. The intelligence model is
individualized, secretive, and application tends to be preventative. Finally, the war
model is applied collectively, and application tends to be preventative and in
secret, though the more collectively it is applied, the less secretive the action taken
can be. Using the variables discussed, it is clear that each of these countries is
currently committed to a war model of counterterrorism. Such a model is
problematic, not only because of the civil liberties and human rights implications
of the model, but also because the approach has been combined with an
unwillingness of each government to address the underlying causes of terrorism.
The United States' commitment to the war model is of course demonstrated
by its execution of the "war on terror." First, the United States has engaged in
several policies which indicate a willingness to take a collectivist approach toward
counterterrorism rather than and individualized one. Domestically, using material
witness warrants and immigration laws, the U.S. government has detained over
twelve hundred persons who have not committed acts of terrorism. In addition, in
early 2004, the U.S. government began a program to photograph and fingerprint all
persons entering the country.535 While the merits and civil liberties implications of
this program are debatable, it is clear that the U.S. government is continuing to
expand the reach of its counterterrorist efforts. The program is also a paradigmatic
example of the "security" model, which is the domestic counterpart of the war
model. Internationally, this collectivist approach is demonstrated by the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq that the United States fought in the two years after the
September 11 attacks as part of its war on terror. These wars, as well as the Bush
administrations classification of the "axis of evil," and pressures placed on Syria
and Iran since September 11, demonstrate a more general willingness to hold states
responsible for terrorist attacks. As in the domestic examples, these policies reflect
a collectivist approach of the U.S. government, which is willing to take action
against large classes of persons in order to reach the smaller class of terrorists.
Second, the U.S. government has moved away from a reactive model and towards
a preventative model of counterterrorism. Domestically, the detention of persons
suspected of having ties to terrorism, rather than merely those who are suspected of
and Pakistan, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 27. 2004. Most recently, the establishment of a bus route
between Srinigar (the capitol of Indian held Kashmir) and Muzaffarabad (the capitol of Pakistani held
Kashmir) gave parties on both sides renewed optimism for a negotiated settlement. See "All Aboard?;
India and Pakistan", The Economist, February 19, 2005.
535. Abby Goodnough & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Institutes Fingerprinting at Entry Points, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at Al.
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committing terrorist acts, is a quintessential preventive act. In addition, the USA
Patriot Act expanded the surveillance powers of the government to allow it to use
FISA to obtain warrants for pen registers and trap and trace devices (including the
ability to monitor e-mail), as well as to obtain roving wiretaps. Like detentions,
these efforts reflect an increased emphasis on preventing attacks rather than
punishing those guilty of committing acts. Internationally, the Bush
Administration has engaged in targeted assassinations at the individual level, and
preemptive strikes at the collective level-as in Iraq. All of these events indicate a
move away from reactive efforts towards a preemptive model of counterterrorism.
Finally, U.S. policy is becoming increasingly less transparent and accountable.
For example, as discussed, USA Patriot expanded the use of the secret FISA court
to obtain warrants in counterterrorist efforts. In addition, the U.S. government has
indicated a decreased willingness to use an open criminal justice system for those
it accuses of terrorist acts. Rather, as in the cases of Yasser Hamdi, Jose Padilla,
and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, the government has opted for secret military
tribunals, and it has indicated its willingness to do so in the case of Zacarias
Moussaoui. In cases such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and those captured in
Afghanistan, it has avoided criminal charges entirely. In sum, the current U.S.
policy, with its increasing secrecy and its emphasis on collective prevention, has
unabashedly moved towards a war model of counterterrorism.
Israeli policy also clearly tracks the war model under the relevant variables.
First, Israel's collectivist approach is demonstrated by various policies, including
target hardening and lock-down mechanisms, security screenings in public places,
limitations on the freedom of movement, and the development of the so called
security fence in the Occupied Territories. In addition, in the Occupied Territories,
Israeli military action in the Occupied Territories, (such as those that were
undertaken in the spring of 2002), and statutes such as those allowing for the
demolition of homes, reflect similar collectivist tendencies in Israeli policy. Israeli
military action against Jordan, Lebanon, and most recently against Syria, reflect
similar tendencies. Second, Israeli policy has tended to be less transparent and
accountable. Primary domestic counterterrorism responsibility falls on one of its
three intelligence services, the General Security Services, the Israeli Defense
Forces Intelligence Branch, and the Mossad. These agencies have resorted to
torture in order to obtain information, and have generally been subject to less
oversight than their American counterparts. Moreover, like the United States,
Israel has tended to rely on military tribunals rather than open courts in cases of
terrorism (at least in the case of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories). Finally,
like current U.S. policy, the Israeli policies, such as preventative detention and
target assassinations, reflect an increased emphasis on preventative action rather
than the reactive enforcement of the criminal justice model.
India, perhaps more than any of the other the countries in this study, has
consistently followed a war model of counterterrorism. First, with respect to
collectivity, in both Punjab and Kashmir, India deployed massive numbers of
troops in order to counter insurgencies there. In Punjab, the infamous Operation
Blue Star involved not only the deployment of large numbers of troops, but the
killing and detention of vast numbers of persons. While not on the same scale,
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similar widespread searches and roundups of militants continued for years
afterwards. In Kashmir, the Indian army or its surrogates have engaged in
widespread retaliation against civilians. In addition, India continues to hold
Pakistan responsible for Kashmir related terrorism. India, therefore, like the U.S.
and Israel, does not treat terrorism as the act of individuals, but rather a
justification for action against large-population groups. Second, India's use of
secret tribunals in the case of terrorism, like in the United States and Israel,
increases the secrecy of Indian counterterrorist policies. This combined with the
massive human rights violations, including torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings,
reflect the minimal accountability and transparency in Indian counterterrorism.
Finally, Indian preventative detention laws reflect a strong willingness to employ
preventative rather than reactive measures in punishing terrorism. In sum, India,
like Israel, and the United States since September 11, has resorted to large scale
collective actions in order to repel counterterrorist efforts. This, combined with its
aggressive use of preventative detention laws and secret tribunals, places India
squarely within the war model of counterterrorism.
That the "war" language has been adopted by the United States and other
countries since September 11 should come as no surprise. But the language of war
could simply be a rhetorical device, or a means of rallying national efforts toward a
common objective, as in the case of a "war" on poverty. Applying the variables of
collectivity, accountability and timing, however, it becomes clear that the "war on
terror" is not simply rhetoric, it is a move away from open and individualized
justice, toward secretive government action which employs group punishment.
This has significant civil liberties and human rights implications. By being
employed against large groups rather than individuals, and in a preventative rather
than reactive manner, the war model essentially exacts punishment against
innocent parties. In other words, the war model takes actions against large groups
because it is more efficient than expending resources toward directing punishment
with precision. Innocent parties become the collateral damage in a war on terror.
Moreover, the political expediency of the war model and its collateral damage is
disturbing-rather than simply being more efficient, the war model may in fact be
a form of displaced anger. Victims of human rights abuses in Kashmir, for
example, noted that the Indian Army (or their surrogates) engages in human rights
abuses against the local population when it is unable to locate terrorist suspects.
536
This presents an interesting parallel to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the spring of
2003. Even if it was indeed part of the "war on terror," the invasion of Iraq was
arguably also simply a result of the Bush Administration's inability to catch top al-
Qaeda operatives such as Usama bin Laden. The response of the Indian army and
the U.S. government is the same-the scale is only larger because the scope of the
conflict is larger.
In addition, the rhetorical usefulness of the war terminology diverts attention
from the severe problems associated with the war model. As Heymann notes, war
requires a massive reallocation of resources, an understanding of tremendous costs
536. Behind Kashmir, supra note 497.
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to be borne, and, among them, limitations on civil rights.537 The increased
accountability which results from the scale of the war model is therefore undercut
by the willingness of the public to defer to the State in times of war. The
countervailing principle which justifies such costs is the determination of exigency
and the limited time frame of the conflict. However, the pre-conditions of
terrorism, in contrast to the pre-conditions of paradigmatic war, are neither exigent
nor temporary.538 In India for example, the National Security Act, authorizing
preventative detentions, was justified on the grounds that:
The anti-social and anti- national elements including secessionist communal and
pro-caste elements and also other elements that adversely influence and affect
the services essential to the community pose a grave challenge to the lawful
authority and sometimes even hold the society to ransom.
53 9
However, these conditions do not reflect extenuating circumstances calling
for extreme measures, they are the description of India's long-term political
condition.540 Similarly, Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and the American "war on
terror" are the result of long term conditions in the Middle East and other parts of
the Islamic world. In short, "'war' is neither a persuasive description of the
situation we face nor an adequate statement of our objectives."' 541
Indeed, an analysis of these long term conditions is precisely what is missing
from each of the models discussed in this study. As discussed earlier, the criminal
justice, intelligence, and war models are "repressive" models which seek to
prevent terrorism through ex ante or ex post deterrence. An alternative approach
would be to employ "conciliatory" models which call for negotiation with
terrorists or reform in order to end violence. By addressing the root causes of
terrorism, conciliation decreases the incentives of actors to engage in terrorism. In
India for example, after political reforms were instituted in Punjab, deaths from
terrorism declined from 2,586 in 1991, to sixty-eight from 1993-98.542 Similar
declines were seen in anti-Israeli terrorism during the implementation of the Oslo
Accords, during which time the Israeli Defence Ministry reported a greater than 90
percent decline in the terrorism in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
543
Unfortunately, the pattern in the West over the past few decades has been to
pay less and less attention to the root causes of terrorism, such as oppressive
conditions and poverty. Examining root causes has been viewed by some as
appeasement of terrorism. Moreover, some have argued that looking at root causes
of terrorism is inappropriate because the "the vast majority" of the world's
repressed and poor people do not resort to terrorism.544 Such analyses lead to
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faulty policy. First, even though not all persons in oppressive and impoverished
conditions resort to terrorism, it does not follow that improving conditions would
not lead to a decline in terrorism. Moreover, it is also true that not all persons who
live in poverty or lack opportunity resort to conventional criminal activity. But it
is readily apparent that we can reduce criminal activity by improving economic
conditions and opportunity for persons living in poverty. Such an argument would
never be construed as "appeasing" criminals or providing incentive for criminal
activity. Nor would it be attacked as unpatriotic.
Second, a stated policy of non-negotiation or non-reform effectively allows
terrorists to control policy. Assume, for example, the Israeli government states a
policy of not negotiating with the Palestinian Authority (PA) until anti-Israeli
terrorism stops. This position allows terrorist groups to exploit conditions to their
best advantage. If they want negotiations to occur, they can cease terrorist acts; if
they want negotiations to fail, they can engage in more terrorism. A policy of "we
will not negotiate with terrorists" in order to prevent "rewarding" terrorists,
assumes that negotiations are what the terrorist group wants. But as many have
noted, terrorists often engage violence in order to prevent negotiation and
encourage repressive policies which turn people against the target state.545 In other
words, adopting a repressive "war" model may be giving terrorists exactly what
they want. Governments should not condition the examination of root causes on
the end of terrorism; they should look at root causes in spite of terror in order to
end the violence. Such a position puts governments in control of policy, rather
than terrorists.
Indeed, of the countries in this study, the U.S. government should be the most
inclined to examine the root causes of terrorism, rather than employing the war
mentality is has adopted to combat terrorism. As many have noted, while terrorists
engage in anti-American violence for a variety of reasons, there is a seemingly
endless supply of recruits to anti-American causes due to a variety of U.S. policies.
These have included: 1) support for repressive regimes in the Middle East,
including Saudi Arabia, 2) unconditional U.S. support for Israel, and 3)
indifference to the plight of Muslims in Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Balkans. The
war on terror, including the invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, has given more
ammunition to the anti-American cause. Unlike in the cases of Israel and India, for
whom reconciliation would require "giving something up" in terms of land, the
United States does not have to give anything up in order to examine its policies.
The change required of the United States by conciliation is simply what the United
States should have been doing all along: examining the consequences of its foreign
policy on innocent populations. Unfortunately, in the 2 years since the September
11 attacks, the United States has adopted a position that addressing underlying
concerns is incompatible with maintaining strength in the "war on terror."
This paper has not been an attempt to develop a set of "best practices" for
counterterrorism. I have attempted to compare counterterrorist strategies in the
United States, Israel, and India through the lens of three models. The criminal
545. SHARMA, supra note 172, at 68; see also Gazit, supra note 323, at 228.
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justice model treats terrorism as essentially a criminal justice problem. It relies on
the criminal processes and punishment in order to deter terrorist activity. In
contrast, the intelligence model treats terrorism as a security problem. It seeks to
prevent terrorism as through direct prevention rather than punishment. But while
its lack of procedural safeguards aids in the prevention of terrorism, they also raise
significant civil liberties concerns. Finally, like the intelligence model, the war
model treats terrorism as a security problem. But unlike the intelligence model,
counterterrorism is achieved through action against large groups of people in order
to achieve either prevention or punishment. The key feature of the war model is
that by acting against groups, application of the war model allows governments to
avoid both the procedural safeguards of the criminal justice model and costs of
precision associated with the intelligence model. But both of these characteristics
raise substantial civil liberties and human rights concerns. Both terrorists and
innocents face punishment without procedural safeguards. Through the axes of
analysis developed in this paper-collectivity, accountability, and timing-it is
clear that all three countries have adopted a war model of counterterrorism. In the
United States, this approach has worked in conjunction with an unwillingness to
address the underlying causes of terrorism. But regardless of the moral
implications of terrorism, an unwillingness to deal with root causes simply leads to
bad policy. Thus, while the merits of the approaches of each country will continue
to be debated, their costs cannot be ignored. Of course, no one approach is
adequate, but terrorism has and will be a long term political problem-it stands to
reason that it will require long term political solutions.
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